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Dodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation
AB 5 TRAC T. Almost eight years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, financial institutions remain
large, complex, and interconnected. Academics and policymakers across the ideological spec-
trum largely agree that Dodd-Frank has imposed substantial compliance costs on systematically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) without solving the problem that they are too big to fail.
This Note argues that Dodd-Frank's compliance costs have actually served an important regula-
tory purpose. By analyzing the spinoffs and divestitures that have occurred at eleven SIFIs since
Dodd-Frank went into effect in 201o, this Note documents the extent to which the Act's compli-
ance costs have led SIFIs to shed business lines of their own accord. The data reveal that regulators
can adjust Dodd-Frank's costs in response to the perceived riskiness of specific business units, and
that SIFIs can respond to these adjustments by divesting the business lines that caused their com-
pliance costs to increase - that is, SIFIs' riskiest lines of business. In this way, Dodd-Frank has had
an effect analogous to that of a Pigouvian tax - what we call a "Pigouvian regulation." Furthermore,
because Dodd-Frank grants regulators discretion to ramp up (or down) these compliance costs
over time, it provides them with powerful tools to incentivize SIFIs to become less systemically
important. We therefore conclude that Dodd-Frank's compliance costs are not a mere ancillary ef-
fect of the law, but rather support the Act's core purpose by empowering regulators to force SIFIs
to divest themselves of their riskiest assets. In doing so, regulators can - and have - made financial
institutions safer.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 13, 2016, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) - the
agency tasked with overseeing the liquidation of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs) during a financial crisis' - convened a meeting to discuss
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's (Dodd-Frank)
bankruptcy regime. During the meeting, Vice Chair Thomas Hoenig noted that
Dodd-Frank had failed to achieve its primary goal of ending the problem of "too
big to fail" - the idea that some financial institutions are so important to the
broader financial system that the government could never allow them to go
bankrupt. Observing that banks are "larger, more complicated, and more inter-
connected" than they were before the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Hoenig con-
cluded that not a single SIFI had shown that it could "address all phases of a
successful bankruptcy if its failure were imminent."2 On the same day, he issued
a statement lamenting that " [t] he goal to end too big to fail and protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts remains just that: only a goal."'
Hoenig's statements reflect the academic and political consensus: scholars
and politicians from both sides of the aisle agree that Dodd-Frank has in many
1. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 204-10, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454-60 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (describing resolution
procedures and giving the FDIC authority to liquidate firms); see also Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,762 (Apr. 14, 2014) (creating rules governing asset sales
during SIFI failure).
2. Thomas Hoenig, FDIC Board Meeting Statement of Vice Chairman Thomas M. Hoenig Regarding
2o15 Title I Plans Submitted by the Eight Domestic GSIBs, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Apr. 13,
2016), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr316a.html [http://perma.cc/8KSC
-WD7V].
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ways entrenched-not ended-too big to fail. 4 Although commentators recog-
nize that Dodd-Frank has reduced systemic risk in the financial system,5 many
fear that another financial crisis would still force Congress to choose between
bailing out a SIFI or allowing a recession.6 What is more, some scholars have
suggested that Dodd-Frank's regulatory costs have actually compounded the too
big to fail problem. Professor Roberta Romano, for example, has argued that
4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 795 (2011) (observing that
Dodd-Frank "significantly reduces the ability of financial regulators to effect a bailout of a
distressed financial institution"); Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts,
and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761 (2017) (arguing that the solutions to too
big to fail exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the risk that banks' morally dangerous behavior
will trigger another crisis); Priyank Gandhi & Hanno Lustig, Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock
Returns: A Fiscal Explanation 1-13, 30 -34 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16553, 2010) (determining, based on risk-adjusted stock prices of U.S. banks from 1970 to
2008, that (1) the largest banks received an implicit cost of capital "subsidy" of 3.1%, due to
the financial markets' belief that the federal government would protect those banks from "dis-
aster risk" during financial crises, and (2) smaller banks paid an implicit cost of capital "tax"
of 3.25% because they did not receive comparable protection from the government); Press
Release, Senator Elizabeth Warren, Statement from Senator Warren on Rejection of Banks'
"Living Wills" by Fed and FDIC (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press
release&id= 1112 [http://perma.cc/8Y2B-WXIA] ("Too Big to Fail banks sparked a financial
meltdown, then sucked up hundreds of billions of dollars in taxpayer bailouts. Today, after
an extensive, multi-year review process, federal regulators concluded that five of the country's
biggest banks are still - literally -Too Big to Fail."); Jeb Hensarling, After Five Years, Dodd-
Frank Is a Failure, WALL ST. J (July 19, 2015, 5:5o PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/after
-five-years-dodd-frank-is-a-failure-1437342607 [http://perma.cc/TLZ7-REEA] (arguing
that Dodd-Frank has failed to end too big to fail and endorsing the Republican-drafted alter-
native); Ryan Tracy, The Dodd-Frank Rule Banks Want To Keep, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14,
2017, 2:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dodd-frank-rule-banks-want-to-keep
-1487066402 [http://perma.cc/8CT9-7T5R] (quoting Gary Cohn as saying that "no one
thinks that [Dodd-Frank] really solved 'too big to fail"'); Peter J. Wallison, Dodd-Frank and
Too Big To Fail Receive Too Little Attention, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www
.aei.org/publication/dodd-frank-and-too-big-to-fail-receive-too-little-attention [http://
perma.cc/S4RJ-X2LT] (arguing that Dodd-Frank, in allowing the federal government
quickly to bail out creditors of SIFIs, gives large firms a funding advantage over their smaller
rivals).
5. See infra Section III.C.3.
6. See infra Section IIC; Kwon-Yong Jin, Note, How To Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Struc-
ture of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single
Point ofEntry Resolution, 124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1765-77 (2015); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. & Stephen
J. Lubben, Too Big and Unable To Fail, FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1-9); see also
Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act's Living Wills: Contingency Plan-
ning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 34-35, 84-85 (2012) (defining liv-
ing wills and arguing that their costs might outweigh their benefits); Hoenig, supra note 2
("Too easily one [SIFI] failure could become a systemic crisis.").
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Dodd-Frank mandates the adoption of "costly and burdensome regulations,
many totally unrelated to the financial crisis, while failing to address key factors
widely acknowledged to have contributed to the financial crisis."' As a result, she
believes that " [Dodd-Frank] has not resolved the 'too-big-to-fail' syndrome. In
fact, it could well exacerbate it."'
Much of this pessimism rests on the assumption that Dodd-Frank could only
solve too big to fail via the measures explicitly included in the text of the statute:
namely, through "command-and-control" regulations.' In fact, even scholars
and policymakers who favor market-based solutions - that is, policy instruments
such as taxes that force individuals and firms to account for the social costs of
their activitieso - assume that Dodd-Frank does not currently utilize them."
One commentator, for instance, has bemoaned the Act's failure to adopt typical
market-based incentives and has urged Congress to improve financial regulation
by implementing a tax on bank borrowing.12 Others recognize that the Act im-
poses significant costs on bank size, but mistakenly assume that these costs serve
no regulatory purpose." Indeed, some commentators even critique these costs




9. Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation and the Safety of Consumer Financial Pro-
tection, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99, 1oo (2011) (declaring that a "core theme of objectors"' cri-
tiques to Dodd-Frank's consumer protections laws is that the law "embodies a traditional
command and control approach"); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Regulation or Na-
tionalization? Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRI-
SIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 69, 83 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012) ("Dodd-
Frank ... signaled a different regulatory approach: command-and-control regulation."); Jon-
athan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 130 (2015).
David Dayen, First Thing We Do, TaxAll the Banks: Why Obama's Middle-Class Economics Plan
Makes Good Sense, GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2015, 11:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/busi-
ness/2015/jan/21/obama-dodd-frank-tax-reform-banks-financial-crisis [http://
perma.cc/34DK-HXDZ]; Fed's Kashkari Unveils Plan To Tackle "Too Big To Fail" Banks and
Funds, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2016, 7:51 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2o16/11/16/feds-kashkari
-unveils-plan-to-tackle-too-big-to-fail-banks-and-funds.html [http://perma.cc/8GXZ
-X8NB]; Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: A Simpler, Fairer Tax Code that Responsibly
Invests in Middle Class Families, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2016), http://obamawhitehouse
.archives. gov/the-press-office/2015/o1/17/fact-sheet-simpler-fairer-tax-code-responsibly
-invests-middle-class-fami [http://perma.cc/VX7V-59CY].
10. See, e.g., Nancy K ete, Environmental Policy Instruments for Market and Mixed-Market Economies,
4 UTIL. POL'Y 5, 5-7 (1994).
ii. Masur & Posner, supra note 9, at loo.
12. Dayen, supra note 9.
13. Romano, supra note 7.
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as allowing savvy banks to arbitrage away from highly regulated activities and
toward tax avoidance strategies that may be just as risky.14 And other scholars
see Dodd-Frank as benefiting certain firms over others, which might exacerbate
the too big to fail problem.5
This mistake is understandable. The plain text of Dodd-Frank appears either
to bar SIFIs from engaging in certain behaviors or to direct SIFIs to follow cer-
tain rules and procedures when contemplating specified transactions. 16 As a re-
sult, most scholars who have examined Dodd-Frank through a Pigouvian lens
14. See Christian Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, and Dodd-Frank: Im-
plications of US Global OTC Derivative Regulation, 14 NEv. L.J. 542, 542-43 (2014); Saule T.
Oumarova, The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age?, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 83, 88
(2011) ("Other than this merger, the Dodd-Frank Act contains no attempt to consolidate the
existing regulatory structure. It leaves intact the much criticized product- or license-based
system of regulation and supervision, in which financial institutions are placed in mutually
exclusive regulatory categories. This vertical silo-based structure creates opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage, particularly within a financial holding company (FHC) structure, which
allows the holding company to take advantage of the differences in the regulatory treatment
of economically equivalent activities conducted in different subsidiaries'"); Ben Protess, Offi-
cial Warns of "Regulatory Arbitrage," N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 28, 2011, 6:44 AM), http://dealbook
.nytimes.com/2o11/o3/28/c-f-t-c-official-wams-of-regulatory-arbitrage [http://perma.cc
/D924-YLSP]; Kian Abouhossein et al., Regulatory Arbitrage Series: OW Europeans over
US ISBs, J.P. MORGAN CAZENOVE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.marketsreformwiki.com
/mktreformwiki/index.php/Dodd-Frank Act - WhitePaper -_J.P.MorganCazenove:
-Regulatory Arbitrage series: OWEuropean overUSIBs [http://perma.cc/A73X
-DCJ31-
15. See Dodd-Frank Act's Efects on Financial Services Competition: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4
(2012) (statement of Rep. Melvin L. Watt, Member, Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Com-
petition & the Internet), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg74976/pdf/CHRG
-112hhrg74976.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6ET-6LW7] ("In my view, Dodd-Frank significantly
leveled the playing field between larger and smaller banks, and it seems to me that a major
part of the dissatisfaction with Dodd-Frank is that we could never absolutely level the playing
field'"). Others in Congress disagreed. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition & the Internet) ("The Dodd-Frank Act could
also harm competition by designating certain banks and nonbank financial institutions as sys-
temically important and creating special liquidation procedures for them outside of bank-
ruptcy. These special liquidation procedures treat systemically important companies' creditors
better than the bankruptcy law. As a result, systemically important institutions, already
among the biggest companies in America, may receive favorable treatment in the credit mar-
kets. This could lead to even more concentration."). But see id. at 14-15 (statement of Adam
Levitin, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (noting that the SIFI regulations should have
the "collateral effect of leveling the competitive playing field between 'too big to fail' firms and
smaller financial institutions").
16. See infra Section II.B.
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tend to assume that, because Dodd-Frank adopts this command-and-control ap-
proach, it necessarily rejects market-based incentives, and therefore cannot have
a Pigouvian effect.1
However, two former members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve have argued that Dodd-Frank's compliance costs -the very costs that are
purportedly "unrelated to the financial crisis"" -can actually be understood as
an economic tool." In two short speeches, former Federal Reserve Chair Ben
Bernanke and former Federal Reserve Governor Jeremy Stein observed that
Dodd-Frank functions like a Pigouvian tax-that is, a tax that corrects market
imperfections by forcing individual actors to bear the costs of the externalities
17. See, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 9, at 129-31; Dale B. Thompson, Beyond Dodd-Frank:
Pinning Down the Octozilla of Too-Big-To-Fail with Multiple Market Instruments, 35 BANKING &
FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 1 (2016) (" [W]e need to go beyond the command-and-control
approach of the Dodd-Frank Act, and adopt economic instruments to correct these market
failures [of Dodd-Frank].").
is. Romano, supra note 7.
ig. Ben S. Bernanke, Ending "Too Big To Fail": What's the Right Approach?, BROOKINGS INSTITU-
TION (May 13, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bemanke/2016/o5/13/ending
-too-big-to-fail-whats-the-right-approach [http://perma.cc/BV7T-JZ69]; Jeremy C. Stein,
Regulating Large Financial Institutions, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYs. (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein2ol3o4l7a.htm [http://perma.cc
/42ZD-D9US]; see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Despite Its Problems, Dodd-Frank Is Better
than the Alternatives, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012 6:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2ol2
/1o/16/despite-its-problems-dodd-frank-is-better-than-the-alternatives [http://perma.cc
/9P7R-VCL9] ("Dodd-Frank tries to figure out who ["too big to fail" institutions] are and
charge them for being too big. This is done by raising their regulatory costs through more
oversight and supervision . . .. [O]ne purpose of this increased regulation is to impose a reg-
ulatory tax on big banks to push them to be smaller."). Solomon, like Bernanke and Stein,
envisions Dodd-Frank's compliance costs as akin to a general tax on financial institutions that
are too big to fail. Banks themselves have also noted that Dodd-Frank's compliance costs act
like a tax. See Glob. Mkt. Inst., Who Pays for Bank Regulations?, GOLDMAN SACHS 2 (June 9,
2014), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-reform/who
-pays-for-bank-regulation-pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/6S3P-SCA6] ("While many of these
[regulations] are designed to strengthen the safety and soundness of the banking system, they
also act as a tax on banks: by changing relative prices, regulation makes some activities more
expensive and others cheaper."). All of these commenters, however, simply remark that the
regulations charge banks for being systemically important. They do not show that regulators
have been using those costs to push banks away from risky activities. Of course, not all com-
pliance costs serve a regulatory purpose. It is hard, for instance, to justify inconsistencies be-
tween rules promulgated by financial regulators. See Joshua C. Macey, Note, Playing Nicely:
How Judges Can Improve Dodd-Frank and Foster Interagency Collaboration, 126 YALE L.J. 8o6,
812-32 (2017) (criticizing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for failing to coordinate swap regulations).
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resulting from their actions.20 Stein, for example, commends Dodd-Frank's
"price-based approach" for "creat[ing] some incentive . . . to shrink" while also
"let[ting] [banks] balance this incentive against the scale benefits that they real-
ize by staying big."21 In other words, even though large financial institutions do
not naturally bear the social costs of being systemically important, Bernanke and
Stein contend that Dodd-Frank forces banks to internalize some of these costs
by making them pay additional compliance costs for being systemically im-
portant.
This Note both substantiates and extends Bernanke's and Stein's claims that
Dodd-Frank works like a Pigouvian tax. We substantiate their argument by an-
alyzing the SIFI divestitures that have occurred since Congress passed Dodd-
Frank in 2010 and by identifying which divestures were motivated- or at least
heavily influenced-by compliance costs associated with Dodd-Frank. In this
way, we document how Dodd-Frank incentivizes SIFIs to internalize the costs of
being systemically important. In addition, we show that these costs have induced
SIFIs to shed risky assets and thereby fundamentally change the nature of their
operations. Put another way, while Bernanke and Stein have argued that com-
pliance costs serve an economic purpose by allowing regulators to fix market im-
perfections, this Note argues that those compliance costs can also serve an im-
portant regulatory purpose by incentivizing SIFIs to shed the business units that
generate financial risk in the first place. Because of these regulatory effects, we
call Dodd-Frank a "Pigouvian regulation."22
Viewing Dodd-Frank as a Pigouvian regulation has several important conse-
quences. First, it reveals Dodd-Frank's novel and effective regulatory model.
Scholars may be correct that firms remain too big to fail, but by creating incen-
20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Con-
trol of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 307 (1972) (explaining Pigouvian taxation).
21. Stein, supra note 19.
22. Professors Daniel Schwarcz and David Zaring recently made a related argument in Regulation
by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV 1813, 1813 (2017). Schwarcz
and Zaring argue that an effective part of Dodd-Frank is that firms have an incentive to avoid
taking excessive risks because they thereby reduce the likelihood that they will be designated
a SIFI. Id. at 1817. They refer to this phenomenon as "regulation by threat." Id. In other words,
the threat of the SIFI designation -and the enhanced regulatory costs that accompany the
designation -has prompted firms to avoid risky activities in order to evade oversight by the
Federal Reserve. This argument differs from our own because we consider how the SIFI des-
ignation influences the behavior of firms that have already been designated SIFIs -not firms
that could receive the designation. However, insofar as our analysis shows that nonbank SIFIs
have adjusted behavior in order to shed their SIFI designation, our argument provides sup-
port for their thesis: if firms divest themselves of risky activities in order to shed their SIFI
designation, then it stands to reason that they will avoid risky activities in order to avoid being
designated a SIFI in the first place.
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tives for SIFIs to shed risky assets, Dodd-Frank provides a blueprint for address-
ing systemic risk without requiring regulators to formally break up large finan-
cial institutions or to establish a viable bankruptcy regime. Instead, Dodd-Frank
gives SIFIs a simple choice: either pay the hefty SIFI compliance costs or shed
risky business lines and, in doing so, reduce the chance that their failure will
trigger an economic crisis.
Furthermore, because regulators can tailor Dodd-Frank's compliance costs
to the perceived riskiness of certain financial activities, they can target the most
systemically destabilizing business units and can adjust those costs as market
conditions change. This flexibility has three informational advantages over al-
ternative regulatory frameworks. First, regulators can tailor the costs to the
unique risks posed by different financial institutions. Second, regulators can ad-
just costs over time as they acquire additional information and as market condi-
tions change. And third, Pigouvian regulations take advantage of relative insti-
tutional expertise. Traditional command-and-control regulations require
regulators to calculate both the costs and benefits when determining the socially
optimal level of a risky activity. By contrast, under Dodd-Frank, regulators
simply determine the social costs of being systematically important and allow
financial institutions - which better understand the value of being large and en-
gaging in certain transactions - to determine the benefits.
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I presents two current regulatory par-
adigms - command-and-control regulations and market-based incentives - as
context before situating Pigouvian regulations between these two theories. Part
II briefly explains how Dodd-Frank sought to end too big to fail and describes
the current view of Dodd-Frank as a command-and-control response to the
problem of too big to fail and the criticisms of the command-and-control ap-
proach. Part III presents our theory of Dodd-Frank as a Pigouvian regulation
and our empirical findings that document how the Act has prompted firms to
divest risky assets. Part IV considers the benefits of the Pigouvian approach and
explains why regulating too big to fail in this way is preferable to other options
generally discussed by scholars and politicians. Part V concludes with a discus-
sion of potential downsides and prescriptive recommendations for how to make
Dodd-Frank a more effective Pigouvian regulation.
I. TWO THEORIES OF REGULATION
This Part describes the two primary regulatory approaches - command-and-
control regulations and market-based incentives -before explaining in the re-
mainder of the Note how Dodd-Frank fits between these two approaches.
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A. Command-and-Control Regulations
In a command-and-control regulatory scheme, the regulator -which can be
an administrative agency, a judicial body, an executive, or a legislature - either
prohibits or requires a certain action. Prohibitions -often called bans2 3 -per-
vade the American regulatory system and address a variety of problems, such as
drug use24 and speeding.25 Mandates are also prevalent and cover diverse regu-
latory areas, such as minimum wage2 6 and seatbelt requirements.2 7 Dodd-Frank
is replete with both prohibitions and commands.2 8
The most obvious benefit of command-and-control regulations is that they
are a direct way for the government to prohibit or mandate behavior. Some reg-
ulatory goals are better served when the government does not need to engage in
a complicated cost-benefit analysis to determine how much of a behavior should
be permitted. Instead, a blanket prohibition or requirement is preferable. For
instance, when implementing Dodd-Frank, Congress decided that most swaps
should be traded on exchanges2 9 and that companies should report certain in-
formation about swap deals.o Rather than charging financial institutions for re-
fusing to report swaps or trade on an exchange, Dodd-Frank simply requires
23. We recognize that a regulation could enact a ban, and that a tax could function effectively as
a ban by making an activity prohibitively expensive. We regard bans as a separate category to
highlight the difference between incentivizing or disincentivizing behavior and blocking it
altogether.
24. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
25. Of course, a speed limit should be understood not as a ban on driving, but as a ban on driving
a certain speed. See, e.g., California Driver Handbook-Laws and Rules of the Road, CAL. DEPT.
MOTOR VEHICLES, http://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/hdbk/speed_1imits
[http://perma.cc/QA4T-T4R2].
26. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
27. See, e.g., FIA. STAT. § 316.614 (2017) (mandating safety belt usage).
28. See infra Sections II.B and II.C.
29. Swap exchanges are generally run by swap execution facilities (SEFs). Dodd-Frank defines a
SEF as "a trading system or platform in which multiple participants have the ability to execute
or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants in the facility or
system. . . ."7 U.S.C. § la(5o) (2012). SEFs operate either (a) under the regulatory oversight
of the CFTC, pursuant to Section 5h of the Commodity Exchange Act, see 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3
(2012), or (b) under the regulatory oversight of the SEC, see Registration and Regulation of
Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,948 (Mar. 1, 2011) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
30. See, e.g., Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (July 18, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
24o) (providing standards for external business conduct); Trade Acknowledgment and Veri-
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banks to abide by these rules." There was no need for the government to give
parties the option not to report swaps since its aim was to force companies to
report information on swap deals in every situation in order to promote pre-
trade price transparency.3 2 in situations like this, when the government is certain
that an action should be required or prohibited, it need not waste resources im-
plementing a complicated market-based scheme in order to accomplish its reg-
ulatory goal.
Command-and-control regulations can also be optimal even when the gov-
ernment is not entirely sure that the relevant activity is worthy of indiscriminate
prohibition or promotion. If the government lacks information about the private
value a company places on an activity, but knows that the social costs of that
activity are exorbitant, it may be advantageous to ban the activity entirely rather
than to embrace an incentive-based regime that risks under-deterrence. Some
have found SIFI regulations flawed for just this reason. For instance, the Presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Neel Kashkari, announced a
fication of Security-Based Swap Transactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,859 (Jan. 21, 2011) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (providing trade acknowledgement rules); Regulation SBSR-Re-
porting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,208 (Dec. 2,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242) (detailing reporting rules); Registration and
Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,948 (Feb. 28, 2011)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) (adopting a registration framework for execu-
tion facilities); Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 65,784 (Oct. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249)
(detailing registration rules for dealers and major swap participants); 76 Fed. Reg. 2,287 (Jan.
13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249); Security-Based Swap Data Repository
Registration, Duties, and Core Principles, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,3o6 (Dec. io, 2010) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249), corrected at 75 Fed. Reg. 79,320 (Dec. 20, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 249) (providing data repository rules).
31. Of course, in a certain sense, all regulations could be considered command-and-control reg-
ulations because failure to abide by a command-and-control requirement could result in a
penalty, and so command-and-control regulations arguably only gain their force through the
costs imposed by noncompliance. Still, despite these functional similarities, we distinguish
between the two on the ground that the goal of command-and-control requirements is to re-
quire the regulated party to do (or not do) something, whereas market-based regulation aims
to adjust incentives associated with an action.
32. Swaps Execution Facilities (SEFs), U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://
www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/SEF2/index.htm [http://perma.cc
/U9HC-KNU3] (" [T]he stated goals of the Dodd-Frank Act are to promote the trading of
swaps on SEFs and to promote pre-trade price transparency in the swaps market.").
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plan to raise capital requirements dramatically in large part to force SIFIs to re-
duce dramatically the scope and scale of their operations." The idea is that cap-
ital requirements are currently not sufficiently onerous to incentivize banks to
downsize. Recognizing that too big to fail firms remain a problem, Kashkari pro-
posed increasing SIFI capital requirements to 23.5% in order to reduce the risks
posed by these kinds of financial institutions. 34Although Kashkari grounds this
position in the desire to ensure that banks have sufficient capital to withstand an
economic downturn without resorting to bail outs," he acknowledges that his
proposal would have the side benefit of forcing banks to restructure them-
selves.3 6 The compliance costs would be so onerous that they would effectively
amount to a hard cap on bank size because banks would be forced to take imme-
diate corrective actions and shrink dramatically." According to Kashkari, current
capital rules do not provide a strong enough incentive for banks to downsize and
simplify of their own accord, but more onerous capital requirements would."
B. Market-Based Incentives
In contrast with command-and-control regulations, market-based solutions
neither prohibit nor require activities; instead, they influence behavior by chang-
ing the costs associated with certain actions. The government uses market-based
incentives to regulate all sorts of behavior. Section 163(h) of the Tax Code, for
example, provides a tax deduction for interest paid on home mortgages." The
purpose of this provision is to incentivize people to buy homes - to give them "a
stake in society and induce [] them to care about their neighborhoods and towns"
33. Neel Kashkari, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Address at the Economic Club
of New York on the Minneapolis Plan to End Too Big To Fail 5-8 (Nov. 16, 2016), http://
www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/neel-kashkari-presents
-the-minneapolis-plan-to-end-too-big-to-fail [http://perma.cc/67NB-NNPV]; The Minne-




34. The Minneapolis Plan To End Too Big To Fail, supra note 33, at 3.
3s. Id.
36. Id.
37. This example shows how something that might look like a market-based regulation -in this
case, a capital requirement- can amount to a ban if the costs become truly prohibitive.
38. Kashkari, supra note 33, at 3.
39. I.R.C. § 163(h) (2012).
1348
127:133 6 2018
DODD-FRANK IS A PIGOUVIAN REGULATION
by providing them a financial bonus when they do so.40 In this vein, the Tax
Code has also been used to incentivize, among other things, the use of green
energy,4 employer-provided health insurance,4 2 and charitable donations.43
As discussed in greater detail in Parts II and III, one of Dodd-Frank's more
onerous market-based regulations is the SIFI designation." Although the pur-
pose of the SIFI designation is ostensibly to force banks to take steps toward
becoming more resilient to economic downturns,4 5 the regulations also effec-
tively charge financial institutions for being large. Banks are automatically sub-
ject to SIFI regulations if they have assets exceeding $50 billion.
46 As soon as a
bank crosses that threshold, it must pay a capital surcharge, conduct annual
stress tests, and abide by certain liquidity requirements.7 And SIFI require-
ments get more onerous as banks get bigger.48 In short, these costs deter banks
from growing larger.
There are significant advantages to market-based solutions.49 In fact, most
economists regard "Pigouvian taxes" - a classic form of market-based incentives
in which the government imposes a tax on a private activity equal to the social
costs created by that private activity- as generally preferable to other forms of
40. Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 2
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9284, 2002), http://www.nber.org
/papers/w9284.pdf [http://perma.cc/A7C7-9EL3].
41. I.R.C. § 45 (2012).
42. I.R.C. § 16 (2012).
43. I.R.C. § 170 (2012).
44. As discussed in Part II, most scholars and policymakers regard the SIFI rules as command-
and-control regulations. See infra Sections II.B and II.C.
45. See Lael Brainard, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Dodd-Frank at Five, Speech at the
Bipartisan Policy Center and Managed Funds Association (July 9, 2015), http://www
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard2ol5o7o9a.htm [ ttp://perma.cc/CYF4
-BG5 7] ("The capital surcharge is designed to build additional resilience and lessen the
chances of an institution's failure in proportion to the risks posed by the institution to the
financial system and broader economy.").
46. Dodd-Frank § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012).
47. 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 (2015).
48. Id.
49. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 270-71 (2002) (noting that Pigouvian taxes have
dramatically increased government revenues around the world); Steven Shavell, Corrective
Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON.
S249, S249 (2011) ("The corrective tax has long been viewed by most economists as a, or the,
theoretically preferred remedy for the problem of harmful externalities.").
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regulation in most market conditions.so One scholar framed the tension between
the academic exuberance for Pigouvian taxes and the reluctance of policymakers
to implement them in the following terms: "To many economists, the basic ar-
gument for increased use of Pigouvian taxes is so straightforward as to be obvi-
ous. But as George Orwell once put it, 'We have now sunk to a depth where the
restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men."'s1
One of the most significant advantages of Pigouvian taxes is that they permit
the best-suited parties to determine the costs and benefits of an activity to do
so.52 Writing about Pigouvian taxes in the context of environmental regulations,
one scholar has observed that regulatory goals are often "frustrated by a lack of
information" when regulators adopt a command-and-control approach." By
contrast, market-based solutions "create a system of incentives in which those
who have the best knowledge about control opportunities, the environmental
managers for the industries, are encouraged to use that knowledge to achieve
environmental objectives at minimum cost."54
In other words, market-based solutions - and especially Pigouvian taxesss -
have informational advantages because command-and-control regulations re-
quire regulators to estimate both the costs and the benefits of a behavior.56 For
example, if the government pursued the nonmarket-based solution of capping
50. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation,
4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2002) ("[T] he traditional notion of the superiority of corrective
taxes should continue to be a benchmark for economists' thinking about the control of exter-
nalities."); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 477, 477 (1974)
(" [I]t is a fair generalization to say that the average economist in the Western marginalist
tradition has at least a vague preference towards indirect control by prices . . . .").
51. N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation To Join the Pigou Club, 35 E. ECON. J. 14,
15 (2009).
52. See Brief of Economists Thomas C. Schelling, Vernon L. Smith & Robert W. Hahn as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 1051 (2014)
(No. 12-1272), 2013 WL 6673703, at *14-15 [hereinafter Brief of Economists] (noting that the
difficulties in assessing both the costs and the benefits to determine the efficient level of be-
havior favor moving away from command-and-control regulations).
53. Thomas H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, 6 OXFORD REv.
ECON. POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 21.
54. Id. at 21-22.
55. All market-based solutions permit regulated parties to play a greater role in making decisions
about how to comply with regulations than do command-and-control regulations, but some
forms of market-based solutions limit that discretion to a certain degree. For instance, alt-
hough cap-and-trade proposals permit parties some flexibility in how to meet regulatory
standards, they would still ultimately cap total carbon emissions. See Brief of Economists,
supra note 52, at 3-7, 12-14.
56. Id. at 15 ("Uncertainty- as to costs and benefits -increases the difficulty for regulators seeking
to judge whether a policy gives rise to net benefits to society.").
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the size of banks, then the government would need to determine both the costs
and the benefits associated with exceeding particular size thresholds. In order to
determine the optimal level of regulation, the regulator would need to know not
only the negative externalities created by every large financial institution, but
also the benefits of scale that each firm enjoys from being large. Under a market-
based approach, by contrast, the government would only need to know the social
costs of the activity. By imposing those costs on the firms, the firms themselves
would be responsible for determining whether the scale benefits derived
from achieving a particular size outweigh those costs.
Unlike command-and-control regulations, a tax on bank size does not re-
quire that the government determine whether the costs of bank size outweigh
the benefits. It may be the case that, although bank size introduces a systemic
risk, large banks enjoy scale benefits that allow them to, for example, charge
lower interest rates, and that those scale benefits actually outweigh the social
costs. If the market continues to prefer large banks after they have been forced
to internalize the social costs of being large, then it seems that the scale benefits
of being large provide a net benefit that outweighs the social costs. Significantly,
it may be the case that a tax prompts only some firms to downsize. This infor-
mation is also useful for regulators because it suggests that some firms -those
that did not downsize - realized scale benefits that outweighed the costs gener-
ated by bank size. By contrast, the scale benefits realized by the firms that shrunk
in response to the tax were not sufficient to justify remaining large once they
were forced to bear those costs. For this reason, scholars have concluded that
market-based regulations have the additional benefit of being more precise than
command-and-control alternatives."
Incentive-based regulations therefore allow the market to determine the op-
timal level of production. As regulators attempt to correct the market distortion
that results when firms do not bear certain costs of producing a particular good,
there is no reason why a firm should not realize the benefit of that good in the
form of consumers' willingness to pay for it. Thus, in market-based approaches,
the government only runs the risk that it will miscalculate the cost of the good.
Command-and-control regulations, by contrast, also run the risk that the gov-
ernment will miscalculate the benefits of the good.
Finally, market-based incentives are typically less invasive than command-
and-control regulations because market-based approaches leave the regulated
parties free to decide whether and how to comply." For example, under Dodd-
Frank, the government not only permits financial institutions to remain large
57. See Masur & Posner, supra note 9, at 101.
58. See Brief of Economists, supra note 52, at 12-14.
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and to engage in risky activities, but also gives banks an opportunity to restruc-
ture those activities in a manner that would be less systemically risky. This flex-
ibility ultimately fosters innovation by promoting technological development"
and creative problem-solving.60
II. ENDING TOO BIG TO FAIL
This Part introduces the problem of too big to fail and examines some of the
ways in which Congress tried to address the problem when enacting Dodd-
Frank. Until now, almost everyone has treated Dodd-Frank as a purely com-
mand-and-control regulation, and commentators agree that those command-
and-control measures have failed to solve too big to fail. Although these criti-
cisms have some merit, they overlook a critical way in which Dodd-Frank has
ameliorated the problem of systemic risk through the imposition of compliance
costs - an argument that we will take up in greater detail in Part III.
A. The Too Big To Fail Problem
"Too big to fail" describes firms that pose a systemic risk to the overall finan-
cial system because of their size, complexity, or interconnectedness.61 Because
the failure of one of these firms could jeopardize the entire financial system, pol-
icymakers cannot let them fail without risking an even greater harm or cost to
government and society.
Bernanke has pointed out that too big to fail firms impose three costs on the
broader economy.62 First, too big to fail institutions create a moral hazard prob-
lem. Because firms and their creditors assume that the government will bail out
59. See Tietenberg, supra note 53, at 17.
6o. See id. at 18. This benefit can be analogized to the preference for performance standards over
design standards. See David Besanko, Performance Versus Design Standards in the Regulation of
Pollution, 34 J. PUB. ECON. 19, 19-21, 41-43 (1987); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From
Command and Control to Collaboration and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regula-
tion, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 292-93 (2017); see also Jerry Mashaw & David Harfst, Regulation
and Legal Culture: The Case ofMotor Vehicle Safety, 4YALE J. ON REG. 257,289 (1987) (critiquing
administrative law for making it more difficult for agencies to promulgate performance stand-
ards than design standards).
61. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Statement Before the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 20 (Sept. 2, 201o), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/testimony/bernanke2oloo9O2a.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZNF8-DHJT].
62. Id. at 2o; see also Jin, supra note 6, at 1760.
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a failing SIFI, such firms engage in excessive risk-taking.3 Second, the too big
to fail reality puts small firms at a competitive disadvantage. Because the pro-
spect of a government bailout lowers the cost of funding for bigger institu-
tions,6 4 big institutions can offer cheaper credit than smaller ones, which in turn
allows them to increase their market share.65 Since Dodd-Frank went into effect
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in 2010, rating agencies,66 financial regulators,6 7 and academics68 have shown
that the market still assumes that the government will save failing SIFIs. Thus,
the biggest banks enjoy a competitive advantage not only because their size cre-
ates economies of scope and scale, but also because the market's perception that
the government will bail them out creates an implicit subsidy that enables those
banks to borrow at lower interest rates.69 Finally, as financial institutions become
66. Standard & Poor's (S&P) publicized in 2011 that repeated government assistance would be a
permanent factor in forming banks' credit, as " [b]anking crises will likely happen again" and
the government's likelihood of support to systemic banks is "moderately high" Banks: Rating
Methodology and Assumptions, STANDARD & PooR's lo, tbls. 20 & 22 (Nov. 9, 2011), http://
www.taiwanratings.com/portal/front/showCustomArticle/2c9c3ld74c7981o4o04c97c71f81
ooo8 [http://perma.cc/CS5S-CNM8]; see also Tom Braithwaite, S&P Warns Top U.S. Banks
Are Still "Too Big To Fail," FIN. TIMES (June 11, 2013) http://www.ft.com/content/fb63e7ce
-d2a6-11e2-88ed-ool44feab7de [http://perma.cc/C62C-YJUZ] (indicating that Standard &
Poor's believes the government could still bail out big banks, despite some contrary state-
ments from the FDIC and Treasury Department).
67. See, e.g., Who Is Too Big To Fail: Does Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act Enshrine Taxpayer-Funded
Bailouts?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 11 3th Cong. 69 (2013) (statement of David A. Skeel, Jr.), http://financialservices.house
.gov/uploadedfiles/113-19.pdf [http://perma.cc/26S9-FNGK] ("The largest financial institu-
tions ... are able to borrow money much more cheaply than other financial institutions, be-
cause their cost of credit is artificially reduced by the Too Big to Fail subsidy."); Jodio Santos,
Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks' "Too-Big-to-Fail" Subsidy, 2o EcON. POL'Y REv. 29, 34-
38 (2014) (describing the advantages and benefits the biggest banks received because they
were too big to fail and the competitive advantage those benefits have given them over smaller
banks and concluding that the largest U.S. banks are perceived by investors as enjoying an
implicit guarantee from the government allowing them to enjoy a lower cost of borrowing
than both smaller banks and comparably sized nonbanks); Bryan Kelly et al., Too-Systemic-
To-Fail: What Option Markets ImplyAbout Sector-Wide Government Guarantees 1-6 (Chi. Booth
Research Paper, Working Paper No. 11-12, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762312 [http://
perma.cc/6HB8-TTB8] (supporting the idea that there is a too big to fail subsidy); see also
Gara Afonso et al., Do "Too-Big-To-Fail" Banks Take on More Risk?, 2o EcON. POL'Y REV. 41
(2014) (finding that the biggest banks are more likely to take more risks, relying on the gov-
ernment to save them if needed); Kenichi Ueda& Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Struc-
tural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions 118 (Int'l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper WP/12/128, 2012), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128
.pdf [http://perma.cc/5S32-4A3H] (calculating the subsidy at $83 billion a year for the ten
biggest banks, based on a o.8 percentage point discount that big banks receive, which lowers
the borrowing costs on all liabilities, including bonds and customer deposits); IMF Survey:
Big Banks Benefit from Government Subsidies, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 31, 2014), http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2o14/polo33114a.htm [http://perma.cc/YDSM
-486V] (reinforcing the New York Federal Reserve's findings as detailed in Afonso, supra).
68. See generally Kelly et al., supra note 67 (suggesting that there is an expectation of a government
bailout).
69. See Coffee, supra note 4, at Soo; see also Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline?
Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees 13 (June 1, 2014) (unpublished
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bigger, riskier, and more interconnected - as a result of the first two problems -
the potential costs of these institutions failing become even greater.70 In other
words, the too big to fail problem has become a self-reinforcing cycle in which
large firms become even more indispensable even as they impose significant
costs on society.
B. Dodd-Frank's Command-and-Control Response to Too Big To Fail
Dodd-Frank explicitly adopts a "command-and-control" approach to the
problem of financial institutions being too big to fail. Although the Act does not
outright prohibit banks from being a certain size, it enacts a number of com-
mand-and-control provisions to reduce the risk that large financial institutions
will fail or that their failure will harm the broader economy." First, Dodd-Frank
mandates regulations to curb excessive risk-taking and to require systemically
important banks to hold significant capital, increasing the likelihood that the
firms can weather turbulent financial times.72 And second, the Act creates a res-
olution mechanism to minimize the effect of a firm's failure on the overall finan-
cial system.73
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1961656 [http://perma
.cc/3VYD-ZKD4] (arguing that big banks borrow funds at lower costs from private lenders
because the implicit guarantees reduce the amount of big banks' credit risk in comparison to
that of smaller banks); Stefan Jacewitz & Jonathan Pogach, Deposit Rate Advantages at the Larg-
est Banks 4-5 (FDIC Div. of Ins. Research Paper No. 2014-02, 2013) (calculating differences in
interest rates offered on various banks' accounts between 2005-2010, interpreting the differ-
ences as the market perception of the banks' levels of riskiness, and finding that the biggest
banks pay approximately 45 basis points less in risk premiums for uninsured deposits).
70. Coffee, supra note 4, at 802-03.
71. Dodd-Frank also creates a third command-and-control provision to address the moral hazard
problem discussed in the previous section. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The Act
imposes penalties on company executives and equity-holders - arguably the parties responsi-
ble for the failure of an institution -as a prospective mechanism for deterring excessive risk-
taking. See Dodd-Frank § 954, 15 U.S.C. 78j-4 (2012); Listing Standards for Recovery of Er-
roneously Awarded Compensation (proposed July 1, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
229, 240, 249, 274), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9861.pdf [http://perma.cc
/B8BB-5W9X] (describing executive compensation clawback).
72. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-94 (2012) (imposing capital requirements on SIFIs); Dodd-Frank,
§§ 701-74 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) (creating new substantive,
clearing, and disclosure rules for derivatives trades).
73. On resolution, see Title II of Dodd-Frank §§ 201-17, which details the new regulator's orderly
liquidation authority, and the FDIC's single point of entry (SPOE) strategy, see Resolution of
Systematically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed.
Reg. 243 (Dec. 17, 2013). On the living wills requirement, see Dodd-Frank § 165(d), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5365(d) (2012).
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First and most prominently, the Act bans specific activities perceived as par-
ticularly risky. The Volcker Rule, for example, restricts banks' ability to engage
in certain proprietary trading activities.74 In addition to direct bans, Dodd-Frank
also imposes requirements designed to increase transparency in financial mar-
kets. For instance, Title VII requires banks to report specific information on
swaps, establishes margin requirements for certain swap transactions, and man-
dates that parties follow certain procedures such as trading on an exchange when
executing swap deals." Failure to comply with these affirmative regulations can
result in hefty fines.
Another powerful command- and-control provision for deterring risk-taking
is the SIFI designation. Under Dodd-Frank, there are two methods by which a
firm can be designated as a SIFI. First, any bank with more than $50 billion in
assets is automatically designated as a SIFI.7 6 Second, Dodd-Frank empowers
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate certain "nonbank
financial institutions" as systemically important if they meet certain require-
ments." Once regulators have designated a firm as a SIFI, they can dramatically
increase the firm's compliance costs. For example, regulators have imposed cap-
ital surcharges on SIFIs - that is, SIFIs are required to retain additional capital -
74. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); 17 C.F.R. Pt. 75 (2017)-
75. E.g., Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Partici-
pants, 81 Fed. Reg. 635 (Jan. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 23 & 140); Regulation
SBSR-Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, So Fed. Reg.
14,563 (Mar. 19, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
76. Dodd-Frank § 121, 12 U.S.C. § 5331 (2012).
77. See id. § 113. A "nonbank financial company" is a U.S. or foreign company that is "predomi-
nantly engaged" in financial activities, meaning that at least 85% of its consolidated annual
gross revenues or at least 85% of its consolidated assets are derived from or related to activities
that are "financial in nature" as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 184 3(k). Dodd-Frank § 102(a)(4),
(a) (6), 15 U.S.C. 5311 (2012); see also id. § 113(a) (1) -(b) (2) (listing factors that the FSOC must
consider when determining whether to impose heightened regulatory obligations on U.S. and
foreign nonbank financial companies). In order to designate a nonbank financial institution
as systemically important, the FSOC must find that the firm "could pose a threat to the finan-
cial stability of the United States" (i) in the event that it experiences "material financial dis-
tress," or (ii) because of "the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or
mix of [its] activities." Dodd-Frank § 113(a) (1), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a) (1) (2012). When deciding
whether a firm meets one of these two designation standards, the FSOC must consider ten
factors related to the firm's size, interconnectedness, and overall importance to the American
economy. See Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012). And third, only firms that are "pre-
dominantly engaged in financial activities" can be designated nonbank SIFIs. See Dodd-Frank
§ 113(a) (2), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a) (2) (2012). This provision ensures that companies such as Am-
azon and Google will not be subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve.
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based on the regulators' perception of the firm's risk of failure." In addition, SI-
FIs are required to undergo an annual "stress test," which forces the firms to con-
vince regulators of their resiliency in the face of market turbulence." If a bank
fails a stress test, regulators may increase their supervision of the failing firm,
prevent it from paying shareholder dividends, or even force it to divest entire
business units.o
These approaches may reduce the likelihood that a SIFI will fail, but ulti-
mately, the only certain way to make sure that a SIFI will not fail is to make sure
that there are no SIFIs in the first place, an approach Dodd-Frank rejected when
Congress decided not to break up the banks." Although the risk of a bank failing
may be mitigated ex ante by measures that regulate its balance sheet and risk
portfolio, it is impossible to prevent bank failures altogether while large, com-
plex financial institutions remain. However, a certain degree of risk-taking is es-
sential for banks to fulfill their mission of connecting lenders with borrowers.
That risk-taking, however critical to the financial system, creates some potential
for failure.
For this reason, Dodd-Frank's second approach to reducing systemic risk is
to mitigate the financial turmoil that would ensue in the event that a SIFI actually
failed. Acknowledging that bank failures can never be eliminated altogether,
Dodd-Frank creates a resolution mechanism to oversee the orderly liquidation
78. Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule Requiring the Largest, Most Systemically Important U.S.
Bank Holding Companies To Further Strengthen Their Capital Positions, BOARD GOVERNORS
FED. RES. SYS. (July 20, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg
/2015072oa.htm [http://perma.cc/JT7Q-8YEJ].
79. See Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2017: Supervisory Stress Test Methodology and Results, BOARD Gov-
ERNORS FED. RES. Sys. (June 2017), http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2o17
-dfast-methodology-results-20170622.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6PW-Q3XM].
8o. Dodd-Frank § 165 (i)(1), 12 U.S.C. 5365 (2012); Regulation YY, 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 (2015). After
most firms passed the 2017 stress tests, they were allowed to pay out large dividends. See Mi-
chael Corkery, Big Banks Set To Pay Out Largest Dividends in a Decade, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(June 28, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/o6/28/business/dealbook/big-banks-stress
-tests.html [http://perma.cc/JW57-J48M]. Citigroup's 2014 stress test failure is a good exam-
ple of how the Fed, in collaboration with the regulated entity, can require changes in the firm's
structure. Michael Corbat, CEO of Citi, had numerous meetings with Fed officials following
the stress test failure. As a result, Corbat initiated a plan to simplify Citi's structure, streamline
certain operations, sell consumer banking units in Greece and Spain, and begin a bottom-up
review of risks in each business line and each country. Monica Langley, Citigroup Fights To
Recover From 'Stress Test'Failure, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2014, 9:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/citigroup-fights-to-recover-from-stress-test-failure-1403291332 [http://perma.cc
/P9T6-GCHX].
Si. Dodd-Frank did not, for example, revive the Glass-Steagall requirement that commercial
banks be separated from investment banks, which was first repealed in 1999 by the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1999).
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of SIFIs.82 There are two components to this resolution mechanism. First, under
Title I, SIFIs are obliged to prepare resolution plans - often referred to as "living
wills"" - that explain how they could be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code.84
Living wills are essentially prepackaged bankruptcy plans. If a company's plan
does not demonstrate that the company can be resolved in bankruptcy, the reg-
ulators may jointly impose more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity require-
ments." Second, Dodd-Frank authorizes financial regulators to resolve a SIFI if
the insolvency of that institution would place the economy at risk8 6 - a power
known as the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA)." In theory at least, the
OLA improves upon traditional bankruptcy because it would allow the FDIC to
82. Note that the Act itself assumes that bank failures cannot be eliminated altogether. The prem-
ise of prohibiting "taxpayer funds" from "being used to prevent the liquidation of any finan-
cial company," 12 U.S.C. § 5394 (2012), and instead requiring firms to create a viable plan to
liquidate themselves, 12 U.S.C § 5384 (2012), is that SIFI failures cannot be wholly prevented.
83. Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), FED. RES. (Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm [http://perma.cc/R462-UPDK].
84. Dodd-Frank § 165(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2012).
85. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323, 67,331 (Nov. 1, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
Pt. 381).
86. In an FDIC receivership, the FDIC takes over the powers of the institution's officers, directors,
and shareholders, including collecting obligations due to the institution, liquidating assets,
and paying off creditors. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2012). Before Dodd-Frank, the FDIC only had
authority to wind down insured commercial banks. Its authority did not extend to nondepos-
itory financial institutions, such as independent investment banks. Id. Therefore, before the
orderly liquidation authority (OLA), policymakers had only two options for faltering invest-
ment banks: bankruptcy - which regulators used to resolve Lehman Brothers - or bailout -
which was used with Bear Steams and AIG. FIN. CRIsIs INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL
CRIsIS INQUIRY REPORT 343 (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic
-reports/fcic-final-report full.pdf [http://perma.cc/N24L-LEZW]. Neither was attractive.
Lehman's bankruptcy caused massive economic damage, and taxpayer bailouts led to wide-
spread protest against the government's willingness to pay the bankers whose allegedly risky
and greedy behavior caused the financial crisis.
87. Dodd-Frank §§ 201-17, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394 (2012). Under the OLA, once the FDIC be-
comes the receiver of a failing financial institution, it can operate and liquidate the firm with
near-complete freedom. The FDIC can "take over the assets and operate the covered financial
company with all the powers of the members or shareholders, the directors, and the officers
of the covered financial company." Id. § 210(a)(1)(B)(i). It can also appoint itself as the re-
ceiver of a failing subsidiary. Id. § 210(a) (1) (E) (i). As the receiver of the seized financial in-
stitution, the FDIC would have huge latitude to manage the company, including the power to
merge it with another institution, id. § 210(a)(1)(G)(i)(I); transfer the institution's assets
(without any consent or approval), id. § 210(a)(1)(G) (i) (II); suspend legal actions pending
against the company, id. § 210(a) (8); avoid certain transfers, id. § 210(a) (11); and disallow
claims that are not proven to its satisfaction, id. § 210(a) (3) (D), all with limited judicial re-
view, id. § 210(a)(9)(D).
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resolve a SIFI without requiring a taxpayer bailout or triggering an economic
crisis."
At least on the surface, these rules seem to follow a command-and-control
framework. Rather than pushing SIFIs away from certain activities by making
those activities more expensive, they instead force SIFIs to take certain actions
to reduce their financial risk. The critical point for our command-and-control
analysis is that it is the requirements themselves - not the incentives they cre-
ate - that are intended to reduce systemic risk. As Federal Reserve Governor Lael
Brainard said of a capital requirement levied on SIFIs, "the capital surcharge is
designed to build additional resilience and lessen the chances of an institution's
failure."" Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen has echoed this view by arguing,
for instance, that swap reporting and clearing rules have reduced the risks posed
by trading derivatives.90
The scholarly consensus bears out the observation that Dodd-Frank insti-
tutes a command-and-control regime.91 Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner, for ex-
ample, have argued that no section of Dodd-Frank- not even the Act's capital
requirements - functions like a market-based incentive, much less a Pigouvian
tax.92 Masur and Posner take this view because they regard the substantive pro-
visions of Dodd-Frank, which they refer to as "command-and-control" regula-
tions, to be the primary mechanism through which the law seeks to reduce sys-
temic risk and end too big to fail.9' On their view, the purpose of the provisions
of Dodd-Frank that we regard as Pigouvian regulations is not to increase the
88. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board Proposes
New Rule To Strengthen the Ability ofLargest Domestic and Foreign Banks Operating in the United
States To Be Resolved Without Extraordinary Government Support or Taxpayer Assistance,
FED. RES. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases
/bcreg2015103oa.htm [http://perma.cc/9B43-B5FN] ("[A]n orderly resolution process
should allow a GSIB [Global Systematically Important Bank] to fail, and its investors to suffer
losses, while the critical operations of the firm continue to function.").
89. See Lael Brainard, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Dodd-Frank at Five:
Assessing Progress on Too Big To Fail (July 9, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/speech/brainard2ol5O7O9a.htm [http://perma.cc/MYV-EC2K].
go. See Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Financial Stability a
Decade After the Onset of the Crisis (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/speech/yellen20l7O825a.htm [http://perma.cc/AR65-MV6Q].
91. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
92. Masur & Posner, supra note 9, at 129-30 (claiming that a Pigouvian tax could replace capital
requirements and arguing that vague language in Dodd-Frank's statutory text authorizes reg-
ulators to implement a Pigouvian tax).
93. Id.
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costs associated with risky behavior, but simply to command firms to adopt cer-
tain risk-mitigating strategies: capital requirements, for instance, are not de-
signed to push banks away from risky activities, but rather to provide a cushion
to help firms absorb losses. Others, including Kashkari and President Obama,
have revealed that they believe Dodd-Frank to be a command-and-control reg-
ulation when proposing new market-based incentives, such as a tax on bank size,
to complement he Act's existing provisions.94
C. Critiques of Dodd-Frank's Response to Too Big To Fail
Dodd-Frank seeks to reduce systemic risk in the financial system, to increase
the transparency of financial instruments, and to end the problem of too big to
fail." The Act was thus calibrated to respond to a specific set of problems that
too big to fail institutions generate.
However, these measures have been met with significant criticism from
scholars and policymakers. Specifically, scholars and policymakers are concerned
that a large bank failure could still place the economy at risk,9 6 and that banks'
own resolution plans would not be sufficient in an actual crisis." Although
Dodd-Frank has succeeded in making the financial system safer,98 the largest
banks remain enormous and inextricably intertwined, and, therefore, continue
94. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
95. See Dodd-Frank pmbl., 12 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012) (noting that the Act seeks " [t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and [to serve] other pur-
poses").
96. See Giovanny Moreano, Full Interview with Larry Summers on Banks, CNBC (Sept. 15, 2016,
5:29 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2o16/o9/15/full-interview-with-larry-summers-on-banks
.html [http://perma.cc/KFJ6-WYRE]; Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, Have Big
Banks Gotten Safer?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 2 (Sept. 2016), http://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2ol6/o9/2_sarinsummers.pdf [http://perma.cc/3TPD-MLQP].
97. See infra Section IIC; see also Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B ofA in
OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REv. 485, 485-90 (2013) (detailing the resolution of a distressed financial
institution under Dodd-Frank); Stephen J. Lubben, The Problem With Living Willsfor Finan-
cial Firms, N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (Sept. 16, 2011, 3:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes
.com/2011/o9/16/the-problem-with-living-wills-for-financial-firms [http://perma.cc/UA54
-2D6U] (highlighting problems with living wills and timing considerations).
98. See infra Section III.C.3 .
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to pose a serious risk to the economy." Indeed, even the policymakers who de-
signed the Act's resolution authority concede that it has probably not ended too
big to fail. 00 For example, Kashkari recently noted in a speech that he "believe [s]
the biggest banks are still too big to fail and continue to pose a significant, on-
going risk to our economy."' The general thrust of these arguments is that the
failure of even a single SIFI would likely require the FDIC or the Federal Reserve
to use taxpayer money to conduct a bailout.
Moreover, scholars and commentators have also shown that the SIFI bank-
ruptcy process would not work as planned, which implies that an actual SIFI
failure may well trigger a financial crisis. The problem with the bankruptcy plans
is that SIFIs remain too complex to be liquidated in the orderly manner envi-
sioned by Dodd-Frank.102 Kwon-Yong Jin, for example, critiques the OLA for
99. See Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-ins, 1 J. FIN. REG.
3, 3 (2015) ("[B] ail-in regimes will not eradicate the need for injection of public funds where
there is a threat of systemic collapse, because a number of banks have simultaneously entered
into difficulties, or in the event of the failure of a large complex cross-border bank, unless the
failure was clearly idiosyncratic.").
i00. According to William Dudley, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "While the
risk of failure of a global systemically important financial institution has diminished, it has
not been eliminated. Without a well-functioning resolution process, the consequences of such
a failure could still be catastrophic." Financial Regulation Nine Years on from the Global Financial
Crisis-Where Do We Stand?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CoP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec.
9, 2016), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2o16/12/o9/financial-regulation-nine-years-on
-from-the-gfc-where-do-we-stand [http://perma.cc/F2GT-ADK3]; see also Neel Kashkari,
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Lessons from the Crisis: Ending Too Big To
Fail (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches
/lessons-from-the-crisis-ending-too-big-to-fail [http://perma.cc/D28J-9H8E]. A recent
study at the Harvard Kennedy School goes even further, reporting that Dodd-Frank has en-
trenched - rather than ended - the too big to fail problem. See Marshall Lux & Robert Greene,
The State and Fate of Community Banking 2-3, 19-25(M-RCBG Assoc. Working Paper Series,
No. 37, 2015), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/Final
State andFateLux Greene.pdf [http://perma.cc/5HUG-YQ74]; Jesse Eisinger & Jake
Bernstein, From Dodd-Frank to Dud: How Financial Reform May Be Going Wrong, PROPUBLICA
(June 3, 2011, 8:16 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/from-dodd-frank-to-dud
[http://perma.cc/R2UH-KS9L] ("Frank and Treasury Department officials acknowledge the
potential difficulty in successfully winding down these huge institutions, but they argue that
there is no other alternative.").
101. Kashkari, supra note loo.
102. Jin, supra note 6; see also Wilmarth & Lubben, supra note 6, at 1 (arguing that "[SPOE] is
unlikely to work as intended" because " [t] he Federal Reserve's 'total loss-absorbing capacity'
(TALC) proposal ... will create a new, more opaque way to impose the costs of financial dis-
tress in SIFIs on ordinary citizens"); Simon Johnson, The Myth of a Perfect Orderly Liquidation
Authority for Big Banks, N.Y. TIMEs: EcoNoMIx (May 16, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix
.blogs.nytimes.com/2o13/o5/16/the-myth-of-a-perfect-orderly-liquidation-authority-for
-big-banks [http://perma.cc/WY3R-W7HY] (noting that banks do not hold enough equity
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"assum[ing] an optimal corporate group structure,"'os in which there are clear
divisions between corporate groups, and creditors can supervise the risk-taking
activities of subsidiaries as easily as those of a parent company. But in reality,
large financial institutions rarely have this clear corporate structure. 104 Ulti-
mately, as both legal0  and economics106 scholars have argued, these structural
imperfections may lead to cracks in the implementation of the OLA. 10 7 In prac-
tice, it may therefore end up being very difficult to sell off subsidiaries or deter-
mine which subsidiaries hold what debt. That, in turn, makes it difficult to wind
down a SIFI by isolating its subsidiaries in this manner.
The living will requirement has similar problems.0 8 Although the Federal
Reserve has noted that SIFIs have made progress in reducing the likelihood that
failure would trigger a recession, it recently rejected the 2016 living wills pro-
vided by five of the eight American megabanks considered "global SIFIs" (G-
SIFIs) 1'0 - including the wills of JPMorgan, Bank of America, and Wells
to fail in the manner intended by Dodd-Frank); Adam Levitin, SPOE: Backdoor Bailouts and
Funding Fantasies?, CREDIT SLIPS (Feb. 25, 2015, 10:22 PM), http://www.creditslips.org
/creditslips/2o15/02/spoe-backdoor-bailouts-and-funding-fantasies.html [http://perma.cc
/4VCU-RS6R].
103. Jin, supra note 6, at 1765.
104. Id.
105. Id.
io6. Levitin, supra note 102.
107. As Jin has argued, "These weaknesses might arise in three ways: (1) since monitoring capa-
bility of the parents' creditors is weaker than that of the subsidiaries' creditors, moral hazard
can increase on net; (2) since OLA resolution carries with it certain adverse consequences for
the financial firm (such as automatic replacement of management), a financial firm may shift
liabilities to the subsidiaries and force the FDIC to bail out the company instead of resolving
it through the OLA; and (3) implementation of the SPOE approach, which essentially relies
on a quarantine of the parent and the problematic subsidiaries, may not be possible when the
dividing lines among different constituent legal entities are unclear." Jin, supra note 6, at 1766.
io8. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REv. 1247, 1310-18 (2014). Liv-
ing wills may have some positive effects, though, such as requiring SIFIs to disclose infor-
mation about their organizational structure. Emilios Avgouleas, Charles Goodhart & Dirk
Schoenmaker, Bank Resolution Plans as a Catalyst for Global Financial Reform, 9 J. FIN. STABIL-
ITY 210, 211 (2013).
iog. "Global SIFI" -also known as a G-SIB, or a Global Systemically Important Bank-is a term
of art. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., 2016 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS
(G-SIBs) (2016), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2o16 -list-of-global-systemically
-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf [http://perma.cc/3GT2-XB7N] (describing criteria used to
classify banks as G-SIBs).
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Fargo. 0̀ The remaining three G-SIFIs did not fare much better. The FDIC and
Federal Reserve found that Goldman Sachs's and Morgan Stanley's plans were
"not credible," and that Citigroup's had "shortcomings.""' As a result, in the
event of a widespread market failure, the federal government will likely have to
provide public funds to prevent a "systemic collapse."112 If anything, this bail-
out problem is even greater now than before the financial crisis since SIFIs have
grown and would now require even more money to save.1
In short, according to scholars and policymakers, Dodd-Frank's command-
and-control solution to the problem of banks being too big to fail has not
worked. As the next Part will show, however, this account overlooks an alterna-
tive way in which Dodd-Frank addresses too big to fail: as a market-based or
Pigouvian regulation.
III. DODD-FRANK IS A PIGOUVIAN REGULATION
This Note breaks from the traditional narrative on Dodd-Frank by asserting
that the Act does not simply follow the conventional command-and-control reg-
ulatory approach. Instead, the Act's compliance costs have had a subtle but pow-
erful effect in counteracting the problem of too big to fail in some startling ways.
In short, Dodd-Frank acts as a Pigouvian regulation -and an effective one at
that.
This Part first explains why elements of Dodd-Frank can be understood as
Pigouvian regulations. It then analyzes how Dodd-Frank's compliance costs have
affected SIFIs' commodities holdings and how the SIFI designation has affected
nonbank SIFIs. In both of these cases, the costs of complying with Dodd-Frank
have driven some SIFIs out of what were highly profitable business lines. Fur-
thermore, in each case, regulators have been able to target activities that they
perceive as risky and calibrate compliance costs to those risks. In doing so, reg-
ulators not only forced SIFIs to bear the costs of being too big to fail -as
Bernanke and Stein argue -but also prompted SIFIs to divest themselves of
11o. Lisa Lambert, U.S. Regulators Fail "Living Wills" at Five ofEight Big Banks, REUTERS (Apr. 13,




113. This is partly because regulators encouraged bank consolidation during the financial crisis as
a way for large, solvent banks to save failing banks. David C. Wheelock, Banking Industry
Consolidation and Market Structure: Impact of the Financial Crisis and Recession, 93 FED.
RES. BANK ST. LouIs REv. 419 (Nov./Dec. 2011), http://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs
/publications/review/11/11/419-438Wheelock.pdf [http://perma.cc/X3HH-BZAC].
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business units that pose a risk to the broader economy. These divestitures made
SIFIs (and thus the economy) safer overall.
A. A Pigouvian Theory of Dodd-Frank
In contrast to the prevailing view that Dodd-Frank is just a command-and-
control regulation, Bernanke and Stein have argued that higher capital sur-
charges and other onerous regulations on systemically important firms could
have the effect of a Pigouvian tax insofar as these regulations force banks to in-
ternalize the costs of being too big to fail.114 Their point is that, because SIFIs
receive advantageous credit terms based on the market's perception that the gov-
ernment will bail them out should they fail, the government should correct that
market distortion by imposing costs that counteract this implicit subsidy.
However, as discussed below, our research shows that these compliance costs
serve a regulatory purpose by incentivizing banks to divest themselves of risky
business assets. In fact, financial regulators have been using Dodd-Frank-
which ostensibly rejected a market-based approach in favor of a command-and-
control regulatory approach-to nudge SIFIs out of risky activities. This obser-
vation shows that Dodd-Frank is effectively functioning as a market-based solu-
tion that is reducing the too big to fail problem.
Moreover, Dodd-Frank is acting like a market-based regulatory solution
without requiring the actual use of public funds. In other words, Dodd-Frank
shows that the government can use market-based solutions without formally
taxing or subsidizing private entities. Indeed, under Dodd-Frank, the govern-
ment can adjust the compliance costs borne by SIFIs in a number of creative
ways.
Compliance costs are the expenditures that businesses incur adhering to gov-
ernment or industry requirements.1 s In the case of Dodd-Frank, SIFIs face a
wide variety of compliance costs; indeed, one study estimated that the economy-
wide costs of complying with Dodd-Frank between 2010 and 2016 were as much
as $36 billion.1 16 These costs range from the comprehensive stress tests to the
114. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Best Practice Regulation Handbook, AUSTRNLIAN Gov'T 18 (Aug. 2007), http://
regulationbodyofknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2o3/o3/AustralianGovernment
BestPracticeRegulation.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4ZU-YFUR]; Compliance Cost, IN-
VESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/compliance-cost.asp [http://perma.cc
/S8QC-XVLU].





DODD-FRANK IS A PIGOUVIAN REGULATION
onerous reporting standards associated with swap transactions to the capital re-
quirements that limit banks' ability to extend credit. Although a few commenta-
tors"' and affected institutions"' have mentioned that the costs of Dodd-Frank
amount to a tax on bank size, these commentators have generally viewed these
costs negatively and have largely ignored the ways in which they are being used
to serve a regulatory purpose.
Commentators have likely overlooked this regulatory purpose because com-
pliance costs are widely considered an ancillary and undesirable feature of regu-
lations. For example, in 2002, Congress passed the Regulatory Right-to-Know
Act in response to the concern that compliance costs were too great."' The Reg-
ulatory Right-to-Know Act directs the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to submit a report to Congress each year detailing the costs and benefits
of major rules as a way of controlling the growth of compliance costs. 120 Like-
wise, commentators have often treated the compliance costs created by Dodd-
Frank as simply an unwanted side effect of the regulatory scheme.121
Our research shows, however, that compliance costs can be the essential fea-
ture of certain regulatory approaches. In the case of Dodd-Frank, it is precisely
the costs that OMB seeks to reduce that end up making the regulation effective.
Thus, the costs of complying with Dodd-Frank should not be viewed as an un-
117. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 19 ("Dodd-Frank tries to figure out who [too big to fail institu-
tions] are and charge them for being too big. This is done by raising their regulatory costs
through more oversight and supervision .... [0] ne purpose of this increased regulation is to
impose a regulatory tax on big banks to push them to be smaller.").
118. See, e.g., Glob. Mkt. Inst., supra note 19, at 2 (underlining the tax-like consequences of post-
crisis banking regulations).
ig. See Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
120. Id. § 624(a)(1) (requiring the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to submit to
Congress a report giving "an estimate of the total annual costs and benefits (including quan-
tifiable and nonquantifiable effects) of Federal rules and paperwork"). For example, OMB's
2016 Draft Report states that in 2014 major rules had associated costs between $74 and $11o
billion. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 2016 Draft Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of
Federal Regulations and Agency Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, OFF. INFO.
& REG. AFF. 2, http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets
/legislativereports/draft_2o16_cost benefitreport 12_14_2016_2.pdf [http://perma.cc
/7YLQ-RZV'H]. The report finds aggregate benefits in 2014 to be between $269 and $872
billion. Id.
121. Ben Gitis et al., Dodd-Frank at5: Higher Costs, Uncertain Benefits, AM. ACTION F. (July 14, 2015),
http://www.americanactionforum.org/research/dodd-frank-at-5-higher-costs-uncertain
-benefits [http://perma.cc/4N32-BEC3] (describing "paperwork burden hours" and stating
that small firms have "pa[id] the price" because of these costs, resulting in "stagnant job
growth").
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wanted byproduct, but rather as a mechanism for shaping the behavior of finan-
cial institutions and for incentivizing them to move away from financially risky
activities.
At the outset, we concede that Dodd-Frank has not yet solved the too big to
fail problem. As noted above, the largest banks remain enormous and the threat-
ened failure of a single SIFI would likely require a taxpayer bailout. Furthermore,
if a SIFI did fail, its failure could still have a devastating effect on the economy
because SIFIs are larger today than they were before the financial crisis.122 In
fact, over the past thirty-five years, the number of American banks has declined
from about 14,500 to 5,600.123 Bank consolidation accelerated during the crisis
in part because bank failures led to crisis-era mergers and acquisitions.124 The
fact that banks are larger today arguably suggests that Bernanke and Stein are
incorrect and that SIFI regulations are not in fact prompting banks to downsize.
Our research, however, shows that the story is more complicated and that
the costs associated with being designated a SIFI have a significant effect on firm
activities. As the remainder of this Part shows, SIFIs are shedding business lines
in response to heightened regulatory costs. Some of this is evident in the sheer
size of assets that SIFIs have dropped: Citigroup, for example, has shed over
$700 billion in assets since the crisis.125 Equally important, however, is the na-
ture of that reduction. In 2007, only thirty-seven percent of Citi's liabilities were
customer deposits,12 6 which are generally considered among the most stable
sources of bank funding;127 by 2014, that number had ballooned to fifty-seven
122. See Satyajit Das, Banks Are Getting Bigger, Not Smaller. Clearly They Learnt Nothing From the
2oo8 Financial Crisis, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 12, 2017, 11:08 AM), http://www.independent
.co.uk/voices/banks-still-haven-t-leamt-their-lessons-from-the-financial-crash-a7625311
.html [http://perma.cc/KV6B-PKHL]. A SIFI failure, however, would likely not have an ef-
fect of similar magnitude as a large bank failure in 2007-08 since, as discussed throughout
this Note, Dodd-Frank regulations regarding capital requirements and living wills, among
others, have made such firms safer than they were ten years ago.
123. See Michal Kowalik et al., Bank Consolidation and MergerActivity Following the Crisis, FED. RES.
BANK ICAN. CITY 5 (2017), http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/15qiKowalik
-Davig-Morris-Regehr.pdf [http://perma.cc/H8SA-XQAD].
124. Id.
125. Nathaniel Popper & Michael Corkery, Shrunken Citigroup Illustrates a Trend in Big U.S. Banks,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2ol6/o4/16/business
/dealbook/shrunken-citigroup-illustrates-a-trend-in-big-us-banks.html [http://perma.cc
/V9XJ-4LNA].
126. Neil Irwin, For Proof Wall Street Is Changing, Look at Citigroup's Numbers, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT
(July 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/upshot/for-proof-wall-street-is-
changing-look-at-citigroups-numbers.html [http://perma.cc/S4D4-AML2].
127. Id. This means that sixty-seven percent of Citi's funding came from other revenue sources,
including $394 billion in riskier short-term securities. Id.
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percent. 128 "in other words," according to one commentator, "not only is
Citigroup smaller than it was seven years ago, but it also finances itself through
more stable sources that are less prone to runs."129 This story has played out
across the large banks. In short, while the aggregate size of SIFI assets has
grown, banks have shed many of their risky assets in response to Dodd-Frank.
Consequently, critics who argue that Dodd-Frank has failed to solve the too
big to fail problem miss an important point: the Act grants financial regulators
the power to ratchet up the cost of remaining too big to fail and engaging in
certain high-risk financial activities. Indeed, regulators have already begun to use
this power to incentivize banks to simplify and shed risky assets, which in turn
has rendered the market safer. In summary, Dodd-Frank's compliance costs have
allowed regulators to craft a regulatory regime much more effective than its crit-
ics let on.
B. Methodology
To test our hypothesis that Dodd-Frank has a Pigouvian effect on large fi-
nancial institutions, we used the Thomson ONE database to compile data for
ten SIFIs.3 0 Thomson ONE houses a comprehensive catalogue of mergers and
acquisitions transactions. This includes not only deals in which one company
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. THOMSON ONE, http://www.thomsonone.com/Workspace/Main.aspxView=Action
%3dOpen&BrandName [http://perma.cc/9GRE-462V]. We chose to analyze the following
eleven firms: JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Prudential, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, General Elec-
tric (GE), AIG, MetLife, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, and Morgan Stanley.
Four of these -AIG, GE, Prudential, and MetLife - constitute the four nonbank firms that the
FSOC has designated systemically important. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Designations,
U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default
.aspx [http://perma.cc/7YLM-WJ2K]. These four firms are subject to slightly different re-
quirements than bank SIFIs, making their inclusion important. As of 2016, thirty banks were
designated as systemically important. FIN. STABILITY BD., 2016 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT BANKS (G-SIBs) 3 (2016), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2o16-list
-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf [http://perma.cc/KCE4-GHUH]. We
chose these seven bank SIFIs because they offer a comprehensive representation of the largest
and systemically important American financial institutions. Many of the other bank SIFIs are
primarily regulated by European and Chinese financial regulators. Focusing on those would
have increased the difficulty in determining which asset sales were motivated by Dodd-Frank.
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acquires or merges with another, but also spinoffs,"' divestitures,132 recapitali-
zations,"' share buybacks,134 and other transactions in which a company sheds
or acquires a certain type of asset.
For each SIFI examined, we considered all announced spinoffs, divestitures,
and other transactions in which the SIFI reported that it had shed assets between
July 21, 2010-the date Dodd-Frank was signed-and December 31, 2016. We
surveyed only transactions in which the SIFI or one of its subsidiaries was the
target company. We further narrowed the set to deals that were designated as
"financial." We did this to exclude, for example, certain real estate deals,' share
repurchases,13 6 and other deals clearly unrelated to the costs of financial regula-
tion.1 37
We then manually analyzed all the remaining deals to determine which
transactions were likely caused by efforts to reduce the costs of complying with
Dodd-Frank. We based these determinations on contemporaneous news reports,
company press releases and regulatory filings, and government regulatory re-
ports. Where Dodd-Frank's compliance costs played a role in a divestiture, we
131. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, THE BOOK OF JARGON: GLOBAL MERGERS & AcQuIsITIONs 204
(1st ed. 2013), http://www.1w.com/admin/Upload/Documents/BoJGlobalMandA-locked
-March-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/2BJ3-S8PA] (defining a spinoff to be "a distribution by a
company of one or more of its businesses to its shareholders in the form of a dividend of the
Stock of a newly created entity in which the business resides. Also used to describe a part of a
business which as been split from the rest of the business and sold").
132. See Divestiture, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/divestiture.asp
[http://perma.cc/ZZ86-X3EY] ("A divestiture is the partial or full disposal of a business unit
through sale, exchange, closure or bankruptcy.").
133. See Recapitalization, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/recapitalization
.asp [http://perma.cc/WKCT4-6F9S] ("Recapitalization is restructuring a company's debt
and equity mixture, often with the aim of making a company's capital structure more stable
or optimal.").
134. See LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 131, at 194 (defining share buybacks as "a company's re-
purchase of its own Shares").
135. On August 15, 2014, for example, Paulson & Co. acquired the American International Plaza
Building in San Juan from AIG. Kelly Bit, Paulson Adds to Puerto Rico Real Estate with AIG
Building, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o14-08-15
/paulson-co-adds-to-puerto-rico-real-estate-with-aig-building [http://perma.cc/STY3
-AESC].
136. In June 2015, for example, the board of Prudential authorized a $1 billion buyback. Angela
Chen, Prudential To Buy Back Additional $iBillion in Stock, WALL ST.J. (June 9, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/prudential-to-buy-back-additional--billion-in-stock-143388253o
[http://perma.cc/RAT8-3TW8].
137. On January 15, 2016, for example, GE sold its appliance business to Haier. Ankit Ajmera, GE
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determined which elements of Dodd-Frank were responsible, and we tried to
explain why. This involved determining whether each spinoff was caused by one
of Dodd-Frank's "command-and-control" regulations, such as the Volcker Rule's
ban on proprietary trading, or whether it was caused by a firm's desire to reduce
its compliance costs. We were thereby able to pinpoint which divestitures were
mandated by the command-and-control features of Dodd-Frank and which re-
sulted from a SIFI's desire to lessen compliance costs.
The results presented in this Part represent he subset of our findings that
evidence the clearest links to Dodd-Frank regulatory pressures. We acknowledge
that there are difficulties inherent in the compilation of data sets like ours and
especially in the structured, yet admittedly subjective, coding scheme that we
applied. In order to avoid having such methodological issues cast doubt on our
findings, we focus on (and further substantiate) those transactions for which the
nexus to Dodd-Frank's compliance costs are clearest.
Because it is not certain that the data set contained all divestitures (some
small or private transactions may not have been included, for example), and be-
cause many transactions fall in a grey zone and were likely motivated by a com-
bination of market conditions, compliance costs, and command-and-control
regulations, we cannot calculate the total number of divestitures that resulted
from Dodd-Frank's Pigouvian effects. We do, however, demonstrate that the ef-
fect has been dramatic. Our analysis shows that SIFIs have divested themselves
of the many business lines regulators regarded as being excessively risky, and
they did so in direct response to regulatory decisions to increase the costs of con-
tinuing to engage in risky transactions.
C. The Pigouvian Findings
Dodd-Frank has forced SIFIs to internalize the costs of engaging in certain
risky business practices, and those costs, in turn, have incentivized SIFIs to di-
vest risky assets. Regulators have thus used Dodd-Frank's compliance costs to
support the Act's general goal of reducing systemic risk. These costs have not
merely forced SIFIs to bear the burden of being systemically important; they
have also fundamentally altered SIFI business activities by driving SIFIs out of
the business practices that regulators regard as unacceptably risky.
As noted above, commentators have observed that while SIFIs have grown
in size, SIFIs have nonetheless shed many assets, and SIFIs now engage in less
risky financial activities. These observations provide initial evidence that Dodd-
Frank operates as a Pigouvian regulation. If SIFIs had simply grown without
becoming safer, then compliance costs would not have had the desired effect of
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pushing SIFIs away from risky activities. SIFI growth, however, has been cou-
pled with a shift towards less exotic financial activities. As we show in this Sec-
tion, SIFI compliance costs have played a significant role in this process.
In particular, this Section will focus on the compliance costs of (1) holding
commodities and (2) being designated as a nonbank SIFI. In addition, it will
show how these compliance costs have led large financial institutions to divest
their commodities holdings and have encouraged nonbank firms to change their
business activities so as to shed their SIFI designation. Finally, the Section will
discuss how these business changes have reduced overall systemic risk.
1. Divesting Commodities Holdings
Since Dodd-Frank's passage, SIFIs have divested themselves of sizeable com-
modities holdings, and they have done so because Dodd-Frank raised the costs
of holding physical commodities. This section first explains why financial regu-
lators worry about allowing banks to participate in commodity markets. It then
explains how two parts of Dodd-Frank-the limits it imposes on derivatives
trading and its capital requirements -have increased the costs of holding com-
modities. Finally, it identifies a number of large spin-offs and divestitures that
have occurred because banks wanted to reduce the costs associated with comply-
ing with these regulations.
For two reasons, commodities holdings can pose outsized risks for financial
institutions."' First, physical commodities are themselves vulnerable to extreme
losses. "' A single catastrophic event could subject a financial institution to
multi-billion-dollar losses. 140 This is, for example, what happened to BP because
of the Deep Water Horizon oil spill.141 Because these losses are unpredictable
and can be triggered by natural disasters, it is difficult and costly for banks to
138. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., WALL STREET BANK IN-
VOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 3 (Comm. Print 2014) (" [F]inancial holding com-
panies ... engage[d] in commodity-related businesses that carried potential catastrophic
event risks.").
139. See Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial
Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,329 (Jan. 21, 2014)
[hereinafter Complementary Activities].
140. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., WALL STREET BANK
INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 4-5 (Comm. Print 2014).
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take steps to protect against such losses.142 The Federal Reserve observed in a
2012 notice of proposed rulemaking that "catastrophes involving environmen-
tally sensitive commodities may cause fatalities and economic damages well in
excess of the market value of the commodities involved or the committed capital
and insurance policies of market participants."143 According the Fed's analysis, if
a financial institution suffered a loss similar to that incurred by BP because of the
oil spill, it would not have been able to cover its losses.144 The Fed went on to
conclude that Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and JPMorgan would each have
to allocate between $1 billion and $15 billion in capital or insurance to cover po-
tential losses from commodities trading.14 5
A second reason commodities introduce risk into financial markets is that
commodity markets are cyclical, which means that the value of commodities rises
during times of economic growth and decreases when the market as a whole de-
clines.146 As a result, while commodities pad bank profits when markets are
healthy, they exacerbate losses at the worst possible moment: when an economic
crisis has begun and a bank needs a steady stream of income.
Conscious that such holdings can expose the financial system to widespread
shocks, both the Federal Reserve and the CFTC have used Dodd-Frank to push
SIFIs out of certain commodities businesses. Critically, though, regulators did
not bar commodities trading altogether -in fact, the rules explicitly allow SIFIs
to use commodities for hedging purposes.147 Instead, regulators limited the
number and amount of speculative trades companies could make on physical
commodities, and they imposed significant reporting and capital requirements
that increased the cost of trading commodities.148 Although the stated purpose
142. See id.
143. See Complementary Activities, supra note 139, at 3331.
144. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., WALL STREET BANK
INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 4-5 (Comm. Print 2014).
145. Id.
146. See generally Aswath Damodaran, Ups and Downs: Valuing Cyclical and Commodity Compa-
nies 1-7 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar
/pdfiles/papers/commodity.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GJ9-95HW] (discussing the dependence
of commodity prices on the growth of the underlying economy).
147. 17 C.F.R. § 4.5 (2016); see also Gary Barnett, CFTC Interpretive Letter, CFTCLTR No. 12-19
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@Irlettergeneral/documents/letter
/12-1 9 .pdf [http://perma.cc/EP6F-XLVD] (affirming that trading commodities for hedging
purposes is allowed).
148. See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701-774 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-1802 (2010). Dodd-
Frank allows the CFTC to regulate position limits in three ways: (1) by setting the size of
position limits, (2) by exempting certain activities, such as bona fide hedging, from these
limits, and (3) by setting an aggregation policy with regard to the overall position limits. 7
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of these rules is to implement safeguards that will increase transparency and
make banks more resilient to movements in commodities prices,149 they have
also increased compliance costs so significantly that they have pushed many
banks out of physical commodities businesses altogether.
At least two parts of Dodd-Frank have played a significant role in prompting
SIFIs to divest themselves of their commodities holdings. Specifically, provisions
limiting the number of futures contracts an investor is allowed to hold on an
underlying security-commonly referred to as a position limit 5 o -made it less
profitable for banks to remain active in commodities markets."' In plain Eng-
lish, position limits cap the amount of speculative trades a financial institution
can make on contracts for the future delivery of commodities. In addition,
stricter capital and liquidity requirements mean that banks must hold additional
liquid assets in order to mitigate risks posed by commodities.152
U.S.C. §§ 6a(a) (3) (A), (5) (A) (2012); see also Proposed Regulations on Position LimitsforDeriv-
atives Factsheet, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N 1 (2013), http://www.cftc.gov/idc
/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/pl_150_factsheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/L6V8
-FQNL] (noting that the CFTC interprets Dodd-Frank to require it to establish limits on
positions). For more information on the reporting requirements, see Further Definition of
"Swap," "Security-Based Swap," and "Security-Based Swap Agreement"; Mixed Swaps; Secu-
rity-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,207 (Aug. 13, 2012) (codified at
7 C.F.R. pt. 1).
149. See id., at 48,307 (noting that " [t]he legislation was enacted, among other reasons, to reduce
risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity within the financial system").
150. See Position Limits Regulation, MARKETsREFORMWIKI, http://www.marketsreformwiki.com
/mktreformwiki/index.php/PositionLimitsRegulation [http://perma.cc/T7DR-SCQ6].
151. See 17 C.F.R. § 150.1-2 (2016). By reducing banks' ability to use derivatives to bet on com-
modities prices, Dodd-Frank increased the costs banks face in holding physical commodities.
Consider the following examples. If a bank owns an oil refinery, it will learn information rel-
evant to oil prices, such as shipping delays or technical difficulties, before the market does. If
the company obtains information that indicates that the price of the commodity will decline,
it will be able to use that information to make a profit by shorting the commodity it owns. In
that way, it can use its informational advantage to offset losses due to price declines. According
to the Federal Reserve, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have used this tactic to great
effect. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBcoMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., WALL STREET
BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIEs 36 (Comm. Print 2014).
152. The source of regulators' authority to issue capital requirements originally came from section
4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act. However, section 171 of Dodd-Frank-commonly
known as the "Collins Amendment" -sets a capital requirement floor and gives regulators
authority to adjust capital requirements. See Dodd-Frank § 171, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371
(2012). Moreover, that section imposes further burdens on financial institutions by limiting
the kinds of assets that can be counted as Tier I capital. For instance, section 171 instructs
regulators to apply the same capital and risk standards to SIFIs that apply to banks insured
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By tracking how banks responded to changes in the CFTC's commodities
regulations, one can identify the Pigouvian effect of position limit regulations.
As we discuss in more detail after our analysis of capital requirements, what we
observe is that banks reduced or eliminated their commodities positions follow-
ing the imposition of these compliance costs, and they often explicitly said that
they did so in order to reduce these costs. Although some firms sold off substan-
tial commodities units just months after the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010,5
substantial divestitures did not occur until a few years later, after it became clear
that the regulations on position limits would actually go into effect.154 Specifi-
cally, commodities divestitures picked up once the CFTC voted to approve a new
rule regarding position limits in 2013.1"' The 2013 rules imposed greater compli-
ance costs on holding commodities.156And capital rules have further raised the
by the FDIC. Id. One important consequence of this requirement is that hybrid capital instru-
ments, such as trust preferred securities, are no longer included in the definition of tier 1 cap-
ital. Id.
153. In March 2011, for example, JPMorgan's hedge fund unit, Highbridge Capital Management,
sold a natural gas pipeline, as well as storage and processing plants, for $1.95 billion. Louis
Dreyfus Highbridge in $1.95 Billion Energy Sale, N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (Mar. 22, 2011, 7:26
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2o11/o3/22/louis-dreyfus-highbridge-in-1-95-billion
-energy-sale [http://perma.cc/ZUE-ICYXU]. Goldman Sachs sold a mining unit as well.




154. We believe that this delay is partly due to initial skepticism by the industry that the position
rules would be adopted or would survive legal challenge. For instance, although the CFTC
published a final rule on position limits in November 2011, see Position Limits for Futures and
Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,626 (Nov. 18, 2011), the rule was initially met by numerous successful
lawsuits; see, e.g., Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n v. CFTC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259, 284 (D.D.C.
2012) (noting that factors rule in favor of vacating the Position Limits Rule on remand); Court
Vacates Position Limit Rules, SurIvAN & CROMWELL LLP 1 (Oct. 1. 2012), http://www
.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC-Publication-Court-Vacates-Position-Limit-Rules
.pdf [http://perma.cc/AD3Y-DRSA]. It was only in 2013, after the CFTC's rules survived nu-
merous legal challenges and officially went into effect that firms began to divest their com-
modities holdings at a significant pace.
155. CFTC Approves Position Limits Proposals, CFTC (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov
/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6763-13 [http://perma.cc/F2CA-K4XK]; see also Position Lim-
its for Derivatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 75,680 (proposed Dec. 12, 2013) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 17 C.F.R).
156. Position Limits for Derivatives, 78 Fed. Reg. at 75,735 (amending § 150.3, requiring banks to
maintain complete records and books relating to all details of their swap transactions, and
specifying that these records can be demanded by the CFTC upon request); CFTC Proposes
New Position Limits, SULIVAN & CRoMwELL LLP 2, 8 (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www
.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SCPublicationCFTCProposesNewPosition
1373
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
costs of holding commodities. Capital requirements and position limits thus hit
banks in quick succession between 2012 and 2014. The result was a flurry of di-
vestitures.
A second feature of Dodd-Frank that has led SIFIs to divest commodities
holdings is its increase in capital requirements. Since the financial crisis -even
before Dodd-Frank went into effect- financial regulators have made it much
more capital-intensive for banks to remain in the commodities business. For ex-
ample, banks were technically required to hold capital on physical assets before
Dodd-Frank went into effect."' There were, however, several difficulties with
the pre-Dodd-Frank capital requirements. Most significantly, banks could re-
duce the amount of capital they had to hold in connection with their physical
commodities by engineering complex financial products that moved their com-
modities exposures off-balance sheet without actually reducing the risks they
faced because of their commodities trades.' A series of recent regulations has
Limits.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6PN-EYYR] (noting that "records would be subject to 'spe-
cial call' by the CFTC," which means any person claiming a § 150.3 exemption must provide
the CFTC with certain information on request); id. at 2 (explaining further that the proposed
rule had stricter bona fide hedge exemptions than the CFTC had historically recognized and
that the proposed rule completely replaced the bona fide hedge reporting regime). Costs have
only grown more onerous with later revisions. See Position Limits for Derivatives, 81 Fed.
Reg. 96,704 (Dec. 30, 2016) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R); Position Limits
for Derivatives: Certain Exemptions and Guidance, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,458 (June 13, 2016) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 37, 38, 15o); see also CFTC Re-Proposes Rules on Position Limits on
Physical Commodity Derivatives, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LIP 2 (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www
.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SCPublicationCFTCReProposesRuleson
PositionLimitstonPhysical CommodityDerivatives.pdf [http://perma.cc/4TC6
-PCBN] (noting that the proposal "would give more control over position limits and limit
levels with respect to all enumerated physical commodities to the CFTC (rather than the ex-
changes), it would extend limits to over-the-counter swap positions for the first time, and it
would incorporate a much more prescriptive approach to the definition of bona fide
hedging"); CFTC Supplements Position Limits Proposal, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 1
(June 3, 2016), http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SCPublicationCFTC
-SupplementsPositionLimitsProposal.pdf [http://perma.cc/HC6K-M3QC] (reporting
that the CFTC's proposed rulemaking "would impose speculative position limits on positions
held by traders in 28 physical commodity futures contracts, options and 'economically equiv-
alent' futures and swaps contracts").
157. Basel I considered commodities exposures when calculating capital. See BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 20-22 (1988), http://www.bis.org/publ
/bcbsciin.pdf [http://perma.cc/PB4K-W33F] [hereinafter Basel I].
is8. See generally Viral V. Acharya, Philipp Schnabl, & Gustabo Suarez, Securitization Without Risk
Transfer, 107J. FIN. ECON. 519 (Oct. 2012) (showing how asset-backed commercial paper con-
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made it more difficult for banks to do this;"' the Fed has simultaneously in-
creased- or announced that it will increase - the amount of capital banks have
to hold in connection with physical commodities.
In January 2014, the Federal Reserve issued an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking and sought comments on whether there should be further re-
strictions on physical commodities activities among financial holding compa-
nies.160 The notice sought comments on, among other things, whether the reg-
ulators should impose "enhanced capital requirements" in relation to certain
commodities holdings. 161 The proposed rule was issued on September 23,
2016,162 and would- according to one source -"impose extraordinary capital
and other prudential requirements and limitations with respect to physical com-
modity activities of financial holding companies."163 Of particular importance is
159. As discussed below, Dodd-Frank is not the only source of authority for capital requirements.
These regulations are promulgated both in accordance with Basel III's and the Collins Amend-
ment. For purposes of our thesis, however, it is unimportant that Dodd-Frank is not the only
reason for the recent changes in capital requirements. What matters is that capital require-
ments are generally treated as important for increasing bank resiliency. We show, however,
that the costs they impose on firms have also had a regulatory effect.
16o. Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial
Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,329 (Jan. 21, 2014).
161. Id. at 3,333.
162. Regulations Q and Y; Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory Requirements for Activities
of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities and Risk-Based Capital
Requirements for Merchant Banking Investments, 81 Fed. Reg. 67,220 (Sept. 30, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 217 & 225) [hereinafter Regulations Q and Y].
163. Physical Commodity Activities Conducted by Financial Holding Companies, SuLLIvAN & CROM-
WELL LIP 1 (Sept. 26, 2016), http://sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SCPublication
Physical CommodityActivitiesConducted byFinancial HoldingCompanies.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2RTW-Z3CF]. Section 165 of Dodd-Frank gives regulators the authority to
adjust capital requirements. These provisions were adopted in 2013 after Basel III. See Regu-
latory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy,
Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted
Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based
Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed Reg. 62,018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts 208, 217 & 225). Those rules set hard capital requirements. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R.
§ 252-32 (2016).
Yet capital requirements are inherently discretionary. As one commentator said,
"[W] hether specific capital ratios belong in the financial-reform bill was always something of
a canard: Even if the bill had specified, say, a 15 percent capital reserve requirement, regulators
would need to decide what counts as capital." Tim Fernholz, Why Regulatory Discretion, Am.
PROSPECT (July 16, 2010), http://prospect.org/article/why-regulatory-discretion [http://
perma.cc/HQF5-8J28]; see also Itai Agur & Sunil Sharma, Rules, Discretion, and Macro-Pru-
dential Policy 21 (IMF Working Paper No. 13/65, 2013), http://www.imf.org/en/Publications
/WP/Issues/2o16/12/31/Rules-Discretion-and-Macro-Prudential-Policy-4o379 [http://
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the fact that the Federal Reserve's proposed rule would mandate "massive capital
increases for the [commodities' trading] activities"164 for all firms. The regula-
tions would result in a massive increase in risk-based capital requirements for
certain physical commodities activities, ranging from a 300% risk weight to a
1,250% risk weight. 165 That means that banks would have to hold between 3 and
12.5 times more capital in connection with those commodities than they did be-
fore the crisis. The regulators had made the capital requirements more onerous
in relation to commodities before these proposed rules.1 6 6 The October 11, 2013
final rule from the Fed and the OCC, which the proposed rule would modify,167
perma.cc/XV6G-GJ9Q] ("[B]oth the extent and the timing of the surcharge are left to the
discretion of the national regulators, as well as the manner in which the credit/GDP ratio is
to be interpreted.").
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve's stress testing and Comprehensive Capital Analysis
Review (CCAR) - the process by which the Federal Reserve determines whether a bank's cap-
ital meets acceptable standards -includes both quantitative and qualitative components. The
Federal Reserve can, and does, adjust both from year to year based on subjective market con-
ditions, and changing methods of calculating the risk and liquidity of capital. Note that the
Fed recently finalized a rule adjusting its capital plan and stress testing rules, effective for the
2017 cycle. The final rule removes large and noncomplex firms from the qualitative assessment
of the CCAR, reducing significant burden on these firms and focusing the qualitative review
in CCAR on the largest, most complex financial institutions. See Amendments to the Capital
Plan and Stress Test Rules; Regulations Y and YY, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,308 (Feb. 3, 2017) (to be
codified in 12 C.F.R. pts. 225 & 252); Federal Reserve Board Announces Finalized Stress Testing
Rules Removing Noncomplex Firms from Qualitative Aspect of CCAR Effective for 2017, BOARD
GovERNoRs FED. RES. Sys. (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/pressreleases/bcreg2o703oa.htm [http://perma.cc/H2SP-LB7C].
164. Jesse Hamilton, Fed Seeks Aggressive Limit on Wall Street Commodity Holdings, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 23, 2016, 5:12 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o16-o9-23/fed
-proposes-aggressive-rule-on-wall-street-commodity-holdings-itfye7o6 [http://perma.cc
/Q8PH-KMVWH].
165. Memorandum from Staff, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. to the Bd. of Governors,
Fed. Reserve Sys. 2 (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevent
/pressreleases/files/bcreg2ol6o923al.pdf [http://perma.cc/8LXS-AB8L].
166. Despite its broad scope, the Federal Reserve's rule would especially burden Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley because they had been "grandfathered in" under section 4(0) of the Bank
Holding Company Act, which allowed those institutions to engage in commodities trading.
Regulations Q and Y, supra note 162, at 67,223.
167. Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 62,018; see also Client Update: Federal Reserve Proposes
Changes to Rules Relating to Physical Commodities, Foreshadows Merchant Banking Reforms,
DEBEVOISE &PLIMPTON (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights
/publications/2o16/o9/2o60928_federal-reserve proposes-changesjto-rules-relatingjto
physical commodities foreshadowsmerchantbanking reforms.pdf [http://perma.cc
/UUW4-2 5Z9] (providing a redline indicating that the proposed rule would, for the first
time, introduce a separate category for physical commodities).
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had already imposed a higher capital requirement han the pre-Dodd-Frank reg-
ulations.168
Along with the other proposed restrictions, analysts have estimated that
banks would have to put up an additional $4 billion in capital reserves before
they could engage in commodities trading1 6 9 -funds that could not be used to
generate profits through activities such as lending or trading.170 As a result, the
Federal Reserve's capital requirements force banks to choose between commod-
ities trading and more traditional lending activities.
In the months after the CFTC's new position limit rules and the Federal Re-
serve's capital requirement proposed rulemaking, JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs,
and Morgan Stanley began to divest commodities units at an increased pace. For
example, in early 2014 JPMorgan offloaded its entire physical commodities unit
for $3-5 billion, its most significant commodities divestiture.1 7 1 Citing regulatory
pressure to exit the commodities business, increased compliance costs, and the
new capital requirements, JPMorgan decided to get out of the vast majority of
its commodities business.172 During the same period, Morgan Stanley sold its
168. Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 62,018 ("The final rule implements a revised defi-
nition of regulatory capital, a new common equity tier 1 minimum capital requirement, a
higher minimum tier 1 capital requirement, and, for banking organizations subject to the ad-
vanced approaches risk-based capital rules, a supplementary leverage ratio that incorporates
a broader set of exposures in the denominator.").
169. Hamilton, supra note 164.
170. See Capital Guidelines and Adequacy, BOARD GovERNoRs FED. REs. Sys. http://www
.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/capital.htm [http://perma.cc/7UXS-JLZW]
("The primary function of capital is to support the bank's operations, act as a cushion to ab-
sorb unanticipated losses and declines in asset values that could otherwise cause a bank to fail,
and provide protection to uninsured depositors and debt holders in the event of liquidation.").
171. J.R Morgan To Sell Commodities Businessfor $3.5Billion,WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2014,1:25 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/j -p-morgan-agrees-to-sell-commodities-trading-business
-1395214861 [http://perma.cc/SMX6-9BZE]; Dmitry Zhdannikov & Silvia Antonioli, JP
Morgan Sells Commodity Arm to Mercuria for $8oo Million: Sources, REUTERS (Oct. 6,
2014, 6:26 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mercuria-jpmorgan/jp-morgan-sells
-commodity-arm-to-mercuria-for- 8oo -million-sources-idUSIKCNoHVoTJ2o141oo6
[http://perma.cc/T2Z2-VWU4].
172. Andy Hoffman & Hugh Son,JPMorganAgrees To Sell Commodities Unitfor $3.5Billion, BLOOM-




THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
oil storage business, TransMontaigne, "' and its related marketing division174 in
order to avoid strict regulatory scrutiny of its trading and storage of commodities
and the increased capital requirements. Within a year, Morgan Stanley sold its
compressed natural gas unit,1 7 1 its physical oil business,17 6 and its European nat-
ural gas and power trading portfolio1 7 7 - each time citing the CFTC's reporting
rules, the Federal Reserve's pending capital requirements and disclosure rules,
or some combination of both regulations. Finally, in early 2014 Goldman Sachs
also divested or wound down its aluminum warehousing unit,1 7 ' a Columbia-
173. See Justin Baer, Morgan Stanley To Sell Oil Business TransMontaigne to NGL Energy, WALL ST.
J. (June 9, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/morgan-stanley-sells-stake-in
-transmontaigne-to-ngl-142316959 [http://perma.cc/ZP3S-3CCN] ("Morgan Stanley and
other banks have moved to scale back some commodities businesses as new rules have forced
the firms to insulate riskier activities with more capital. Wall Street is also bracing for stiffer
U.S. regulations on the way those same banks trade and store oil, natural gas, aluminum and
other commodities."); Hoffman & Son, supra note 172.
174. See Parkland Fuel Corporation Enters Quebec Market with New Supply Agreement and Assumption
of TransMontaigneBusiness, MARKETWIRED (Apr. 2,2013,3:00 PM), http://www.marketwired
.com/press-release/parldand-fuel-corporation-enters-quebec-market-with-new-supply
-agreement-assumption-tsx-pki-1774413.htm [http://perma.cc/LAU6-NLHQ].
175. See Elizabeth Dexheimer, Morgan Stanley Agrees To Sell Wentworth to Pentagon Energy, BLOOM-
BERG (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o15-03-30
/morgan-stanley-agrees-to-sell-wentworth-to-pentagon-energy [http://perma.cc/K4EZ
-XAS4]; Lauren Tara LaCapra, Morgan Stanley To Sell Natural Gas Business Scrutinized by Fed,
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/morganstanley-natgas
/exclusive-morgan-stanley-to-sell-natural-gas-business-scrutinized-by-fed-idUKL2NoWT
26T20150330 [http://perma.cc/AJ94-RVXL].
176. Jonathan Leff, Castleton Joins Oil Trade Titans with Morgan Stanley Deal, REUTERs (May 11,
2015, 6:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/morgan-stanley-castleton-oil/update-2
-castleton-joins-oil-trade-titans-with-morgan-stanley-deal-idUSL3NoY26WE2o05o11
[http://perma.cc/3TUQ-VALU] (" [T]he sale concludes [Morgan Stanley's] years-long effort
to divest a physical trading division that had come under intense regulatory scrutiny and suf-
fered waning profitability.").
177. Rakteem Katakey & Rachel Morison, Shell Buys Morgan Stanley's European Gas, Power-Trading
Book, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2015, 7:04 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o15
- 07-10/shell-buys-morgan-stanley-s- europe-gas-power-trading-portfolio [http://perma.cc
/E68P-UZVF] ("Increased scrutiny by regulators including the U.S. Federal Reserve and pol-
iticians has prompted major banks to cut back or abandon their commodity businesses."); see
also Ron Bousso, Shell Buys Morgan Stanley's Europe Gas and Power Trade Book, REUTERS (July
10, 2015 5:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-shell-morgan-stanley-trading/shell
-buys-morgan-stanleys-europe-gas-and-power-trade-book-idUSKCNoPKoXO20150o7
[http://perma.cc/447C-E7HX].
178. See Christian Berthelsen & Ira losebashvili, Goldman Sachs Sells Aluminum Business to Swiss
Firm, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2014, 5:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-sachs
-sells-aluminum-business-to-swiss-firm-1419279027 [http://perma.cc/7FMZ-KCJMP];
Tatyana Shumsky & Christian Berthelsen, Goldman Puts Metals Warehouse Business Up for Sale,
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based coal mine operation,179 and a uranium trading business,s0 all to reduce its
exposure to commodities in light of increasing compliance costs.
Ultimately, although it is clear that Dodd-Frank regulations caused these di-
vestitures, they did not operate in a typical command-and-control manner. In-
stead, Dodd-Frank put regulatory pressure on firms to choose which commodi-
ties activities to retain and which to abandon - and the firms chose in different
ways. Morgan Stanley, for instance, sold its physical oil business, and reportedly
has plans to sell its stake in an oil tanker group.1"' However, the firm has held
onto its client-facilitation oil-trading desk.182 in contrast, while Goldman Sachs
divested itself of various commodities holdings,8' it has been building out other
aspects of its commodities business to a much greater extent than its peers.184
WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2014, 3:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-puts-metals
-warehouse-business-up-for-sale-140o6152o5 [http://perma.cc/V8H6-V9H7] ("Goldman is
looking to exit the metal warehouse business as regulators are increasing their scrutiny of
banks' role in commodity markets. The Federal Reserve recently closed a comment period
soliciting public input on the scope of potential new rules to oversee the industry.").
179. See lanthe Jeanne Dugan & Timothy Puko, Goldman Sachs Sells Colombian Coal Mines to Mur-
ray Energy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2015, 10:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman
-sachs-sells-colombian-coal-mines-to-murray-energy-143951846o [http://perma.cc/X8A2
-FAHH] ("U.S. lawmakers and regulators have been pushing banks to reduce their exposure
to raw commodities, citing potential risks such as explosions and hidden financial expo-
sure."); see also Goldman Sells Colombia Coal Unit, Ending Physical Commodity Forays, REUTERS
(Aug. 13, 2015, 7:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/goldman-colombia-coal/update
-1-goldman-sells-colombia-coal-unit-ending-physical-commodity-forays-idUSLINio03B
920150813 [http://perma.cc/BX8Y-9MTL].
18o. See Michael J. Moore, Goldman Sachs To Wind Down Uranium Unit After Failing To Sell,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2014 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o14-11-19
/goldman-sachs-to-wind-down-uranium-unit-after-failing-to-sell [http://perma.cc/MD8Z
-JTICA]; Resource Investing News, Goldman Sachs Selling Uranium Trading Business,
THESTREET (Feb. 13, 2014, 3:15 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/12398112/1/goldman
-sachs-selling-uranium-trading-business.html [http://perma.cc/D2AA-X97Y].
181. Jonathan Leff, Castleton Joins Oil Trade Titans with Morgan Stanley Deal, REUTERS (May 12,
2015, 5:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-morgan-stanley/castleton-joins-oil
-trade-titans-with-morgan-stanley-deal-idUSKBNoNW2402o150512 [http://perma.cc
/BQ8G-4IVD].
182. Press Release, Morgan Stanley Completes Sale of Global Oil Merchanting Business to
Castleton Commodities International LLC, MORGAN STANLEY, (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www
.morganstanley.com/press-releases/2e458d2-0231 4 9 3b-a95a-5084c3b4c701 [http://perma
.cc/WM9L-KTDW].
183. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text.
184. Dakin Campbell et al., Goldman Sachs Seeks Stars To Revive Commodities Unit, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 21, 2017, 5:oo AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o17-o8-21/goldman
-sachs-is-said-to-seek-stars-to-revive-commodities-unit [http://perma.cc/63TP-FTUH];
Lauren Tara LaCapra, Goldman Sachs Touts Commodities Muscle as Rivals Shrink,
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Whether these choices have reduced systemic risk enough to satisfy regulators
will only be revealed in future regulatory actions.
In summary, these two sets of regulations - from the CFTC and the Federal
Reserve -have massively increased the cost of complying with commodities
rules: the CFTC's rules prevent banks from limiting exposure by reducing their
ability to make speculative bets, and the Federal Reserve's rules impose height-
ened capital requirements and more extensive reporting responsibilities. SIFIs
have responded to these regulations by leaving - or at least substantially reduc-
ing their presence in- commodities markets. Furthermore, these divestitures
have occurred in highly lucrative businesses.' The units divested by JPMorgan,
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley listed above were worth billions of dollars.
The simplest explanation is that the costs of complying with Dodd-Frank's
heightened reporting and capital requirements make it too expensive for banks
to continue operations that once were highly profitable.
Finally, these results are distinctively Pigouvian in nature. Unlike traditional
command-and-control regulations, Dodd-Frank did not bar SIFIs from remain-
ing active in these markets: there is no prohibition on commodities trading. In-
stead, the Act has simply made it more expensive for banks to be active in these
spaces by requiring that they hold more capital and abide by expensive position
limits. The critical point is not simply that divestitures occurred. Indeed, every
regulation is costly, and it is unsurprising that such costs would affect a bank's
business structure. Instead, what is unique to Dodd-Frank, and in particular its
reporting and capital requirements, is that its compliance costs are not mere an-
cillary effects. They are the direct mechanism by which financial regulators in-
centivize firms to divest business units that regulators regard as risky. In doing
so, regulators have used the costs of complying with Dodd-Frank to serve the
law's core regulatory purpose.
REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2015 5:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/aricle/us-goldmansachs-results
-commodities/goldman-sachs-touts-commodities-muscle-as-rivals-shrink-idUSKBNoKP2
HD2ol5o116 [http://perma.cc/XXZ5-59NE] (noting that Goldman Sachs has "stuck with
commodities" activities while its rivals have been pulling back).
185. E.g., Quarterly Report (Form io-Q) 39-40, MORGAN STANLEY (Feb. 28, 20o6), http://www
.morganstanley.com/about-us-ir/shareholder/loqo2o6/loqo2o6.pdf [http://perma.cc
/64RW-3AK9] ("Fixed income sales and trading revenues were a record $2,724 million, up
36% from the first quarter of fiscal 20o5. The increase was driven by strong performances in
commodities and credit products. Commodities revenues increased to a record level, primarily
due to record revenues from electricity and natural gas products and oil liquids.").
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2. Shedding of SIFI Designation by Nonbank Firms
The experience of nonbank SIFIs offers additional evidence that regulators
have used Dodd-Frank's costs to push SIFIs away from risky activities. Many
bank SIFIs have virtually no ability to shed their SIFI designation. So long as a
bank has more than $50 billion in assets - and most bank SIFIs are many times
that size - financial regulators are statutorily required to designate the bank as a
SIFI.186 This bright-line cut-off does not, however, apply to nonbank SIFIs. As
a result, while bank SIFIs are only able to reduce the costs of complying with
Dodd-Frank's SIFI designation, nonbank SIFIs can choose to eliminate those
costs entirely. Specifically, by convincing financial regulators that they no longer
pose a risk to American financial stability, nonbank SIFIs can shed their SIFI
designation and jettison the SIFI compliance costs altogether. Indeed, as of No-
vember 2017, two of the four designated nonbank SIFIs - GE Capital (GECC)
and American Insurance Group (AIG) - have successfully had their designation
rescinded by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).
A nonbank SIFI is created when the FSOC designates a firm as systemically
important based on FSOC's determination that material financial distress at the
firm would pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.1"' Because these determina-
tions are discretionary, they can be made and revoked as firm activities and size
186. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1) (2012). Congress has recently proposed raising the $50 billion cutoff
to $250 billion. See Michelle Price & Pete Schroeder, Senate Reaches Deal To Cut Number of
Systemically Important Banks, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2017, 1:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-congress-banks/senate-reaches-deal-to-cut-number-of-systemically
-important-banks-idUSKBNIDD2A5 [http://perma.cc/2G76-9UHE].
187. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2012).
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change.' Thus far, FSOC has designed four nonbank firms as systemically im-
portant: GECC,"' AIG, 10 Prudential Financial,"' and MetLife. 1 9 2
is. Dodd-Frank requires FSOC to consider io factors: (1) the extent of the leverage of the com-
pany; (2) the extent and nature of the off-balance-sheet exposures of the company; (3) the
extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company with other significant
nonbank financial companies and significant bank holding companies; (4) the importance of
the company as a source of credit for households, businesses, and State and local governments
and as a source of liquidity for the U.S. financial system; (5) the importance of the company
as a source of credit for low-income, minority, or underserved communities, and the impact
that the failure of such company would have on the availability of credit in such communities;
(6) the extent to which assets are managed rather than owned by the company, and the extent
to which ownership of assets under management is diffuse; (7) the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities of the company; (8) the degree to
which the company is already regulated by one or more primary financial regulatory agencies;
(9) the amount and nature of the financial assets of the company; and (1o) the amount and
types of the liabilities of the company, including the degree of reliance on short-term funding.
Dodd-Frank § 113(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2) (2012). However, the Council may also con-
sider any other risk-related factors that it deems appropriate, id., demonstrating the subjective
nature of this determination. FSOC promulgated rules indicating how it would apply these
factors, 12 C.F.R. § 1310, and released supplemental guidelines for the designation of nonbank
SIFIs. These guidelines indicate that FSOC considers both "quantitative and qualitative anal-
yses" in making its determinations. Supplemental Procedures Relating to Nonbank Financial




18g. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding General Electric




190. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding American Inter-




191. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding Prudential Fi-
nancial, Inc., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov
/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Prudential%2oFinancial%2olnc.pdf [http://
perma.cc/V7RJ-YKJS].
192. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding MetLife, Inc.,
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These firms have responded differently to their SIFI designations. GECC
sought to be de-designated as a SIFI and successfully achieved its goal by ag-
gressively shedding risky assets. AIG, too, has successfully shed its SIFI desig-
nation. By contrast, MetLife has successfully taken to the courts and Prudential
seems likely to follow.
a. GECC's Response
GECC represents the paradigmatic example of a nonbank SIFI responding
to the compliance costs created by the SIFI designation. GECC began shedding
certain assets shortly after being designed a SIFI in 2013. GECC made its inten-
tions public on April 10, 2015, when General Electric- GECC's parent com-
pany- announced that, in an effort to "create a simpler, more valuable company,"
it intended to "reduc[e] the size of its financial businesses through the sale of
most GECC assets.""' GECC explicitly noted that it was adopting this approach
based on its plan to "work closely with [regulators] to take the actions necessary
to de-designate GE Capital as a [SIFI]. "194 From 2012 to its 2016 rescission re-
quest, GECC had sold 52% of its total assets. 1 9 5
The following chart, taken from the summary of GECC's rescission request,
demonstrates the extent of GECC's divestitures:
193. Press Release, GE To Create Simpler, More Valuable Industrial Company by Selling Most GE
Capital Assets; Potential To Return More than $90 Billion to Investors Through 2018 in
Dividends, Buyback & Synchrony Exchange, GEN. ELEc. (Apr. 10, 2015) [hereinafter GE
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TABLE 1.

























Exit of U.S. banking through the separation from
Synchrony Financial and its subsidiary,
Synchrony Bank, and the pending sale of GE
Capital Bank's U.S. online deposit platform and
all of its deposits, including online savings
accounts, online CDs, and brokered CDs
Reduction in foreign banking entities through
the sale of banks in Switzerland, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Hungary, Russia, and Latvia
Exit of consumer mortgage business in the
United Kingdom through sales of assets
Exit of consumer financing businesses in South
Korea, Australia, and New Zealand through sales
of assets
Exit of U.S. and European Sponsor Finance
businesses through sales of assets
Exit of certain lending and leasing lines of
business in the United States, Japan, Mexico,
Canada, South Korea, Australia, and New
Zealand through sales of equipment, healthcare,
vendor finance, fleet, rail, corporate aircraft, and
other lending and leasing assets
Reduction in inventory financing assets hrough
sales of assets in the United States and Canada
Reduction of joint ventures and other equity
investments related to commercial lending and
leasing
Sale of substantially all commercial real estate

















Total Assets Divested: $272 billion
As a result of these spinoffs and divestitures, GECC submitted its rescission
request to FSOC on March 31, 2016, requesting de-designation as a SIFI.9̀ On
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June 28, 2016, FSOC granted GECC's request." In its decision, FSOC noted
that GECC had "fundamentally changed its business ... [tihrough a series of
divestitures, a transformation of its funding model, and a corporate reorganiza-
tion," that had made the company "a much less significant participant in financial
markets and the economy."'99 FSOC also emphasized that GECC had "decreased
its total assets by over 50 percent, shifted away from short-term funding, and
reduced its interconnectedness with large financial institutions."2 00 In short,
thanks to its strategic response to the SIFI designation, GECC was officially freed
from the compliance costs of being designated a SIFI.201
GECC's designation and rescission process highlights three potential bene-
fits of Pigouvian taxes or regulations: (1) the flexibility granted to the enforcing
regulators, (2) the possibility of a dynamic relationship between the regulated
entity and its regulator, and (3) the ability of the regulated party, rather than the
regulator, to determine how the company should adapt o regulatory pressures.
Government regulators made their first move on July 8, 2013, when FSOC
designated GECC as systemically important. In its designation decision, FSOC
noted that "material financial distress at [GECC] could pose a threat to U.S. fi-
nancial stability" and further "that GE [CC] should be subject to supervision by
the [Federal Reserve] and enhanced prudential standards."20 2 Then, on July 24,
2015, in accordance with Section 165 of Dodd-Frank2 0 3- which requires the Fed-
eral Reserve to enforce enhanced prudential standards (EPS) on nonbank SIFIs
that regulate risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits (or, in the al-
ternative, liquidity requirements, overall risk management requirements, reso-
198. Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight Council Announces Rescission of Nonbank Fi-




201. Shaking off the yoke of enhanced Federal Reserve oversight proved to be a boon to GECC's
parent company, General Electric. Between April 10, 2015-when General Electric announced
it would unload most of its GECC Asset- and June 28, 2016 - the date FSOC granted GECC's
rescission request- General Electric added $5o billion in market capitalization, or about $5.25
per share. GE's stock increased about 20%, while the broader market stayed flat. See Rob Cox,
Shedding "Too Big To Fail" Label Was Worth $5o Billion to G.E., N.Y. TIMEs (June 29, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/o6/3o/business/dealbook/shedding-too-big-to-fail-label
-was-worth-5o-billion-to-ge.html [http://perma.cc/2M9F-FF78].
202. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding General Electric
Capital Corp., Inc., supra note 189.
203. Dodd-Frank § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012).
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lution plan and credit exposure report requirements, and concentration lim-
its),204 the Federal Reserve promulgated its final rule announcing the EPS that
would apply to GECC.2 05 The Federal Reserve observed that " [i] n light of the
substantial similarity of GECC's activities and risk profile to that of a similarly
sized bank holding company, the enhanced prudential standards adopted by the
Board are similar to those that apply to large bank holding companies .... ."206
More significantly, however, the Federal Reserve also announced that it had
taken note of GECC's announced plans to divest certain assets and had struc-
tured its regulations in two phases with that in mind.20 7 The main body of stand-
ards became effective on January 1, 2016.208 But just six months later, before the
second body of standards came into effect, the Federal Reserve announced the
rescission of GECC's SIFI designation, noting that its failure no longer posed a
systemic threat.209
GECC demonstrates the flexibility given to regulators under Dodd-Frank to
adjust costs depending on a firm's changing circumstances. In GECC's case, there
were at least four different levels of regulation it could have faced: (1) its initial
designation, (2) the first set of standards, (3) the second set of standards, and
(4) no regulation. Under Dodd-Frank, regulators could move between these dif-
ferent levels of regulations in response to GECC's actions. In this way, the Pigou-
vian scheme allowed regulators to work closely with GECC to "right size" the
firm in a matter of months.
Although most of the discussions between GECC and FSOC were confiden-
tial, publicly available information provides strong evidence of the centrality of
the dynamic relationship between GECC and FSOC in the lead-up to the rescis-
sion decision:
204. Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards Materials, DAVIs POLK (July 21, 2010), http://www
.davispolk.com/files/Dodd-Frank ActSections_165_and_166.pdf [http://perma.cc/4SZV
-Y8LF]. Under this provision, the Fed may regulate contingent capital requirements, public
disclosures, short-term debt limits, and anything else it deems appropriate. Id.
205. Application ofEnhanced Prudential Standards and Reporting Requirements to General Electric Cap-
ital Corporation, FED. RES. Sys. (July 24, 2015), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-07
-2 4 /pdf/2o1 5 -18124 .pdf [http://perma.cc/U3NN-DD9D].
2o6. Id.
207. GE To Create Simpler, supra note 193.
208. Id.
209. Financial Stability Oversight Council Announces Rescission of Nonbank Financial Company
Designation, supra note 198.
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TABLE 2.
TIMELINE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GECC AND FSOC
Early 2015: GECC began meeting with financial regulators about how to reduce the potential
risks GECC could pose to financial stability.2 10
March 15, 201,j GE(Vse s its Nc\\Zealand an Australian conlsirnr financ arills for $.
April 1o, 2015: GECC announces plans to significantly reduce assets to shed its SIFI label.-"-
GE reiterated that it intended to "work closely with these bodies to take the actions necessary
to de-designate GECC as a [SIFI]."21 3
Ju~ne 30, 201;5 : GECC innotinces plIans to sell itts Etirope~ln pi Ivtc equin finmlcing' bu1si ecss
to Sumitomo M\its ui Banking Corpl. 1
August 13, 2015j: GE sells its online baink to Goldman S'achs.21
October 13j. 201:G anucd hn . el$0 ilo of its commellrciall kniding an1d leas-
im ti sins cs to \Wdl Is Fa rgo. 1
November 17, 2015: GECC completes its IPO of Synchrony Financial, which, along with its
15% offering in March 2014, totals approximately $87 billion in assets spun off.2 1 7
210. Id. at 3.




212. GE To Create Simpler, supra note 193.
213. Id. ("'We have a constructive relationship with our regulators and will continue to work with
them as we go through this process,' Immelt said.").
214. GE Capital To Sell European Private Equity Financing Business to Sumitomo Mitsui, PIONLINE
(June 30, 2015), http://www.pionline.com/article/2o15o630/ONLINE/15o639982/ge-capital
-to-sell-european-private-equity-financing-business-to-sumitomo-mitsui [http://perma.cc
/P 7VC-ZQX8].
215. Press Release, Goldman To Buy GE Online Bank With $16 Billion ofDeposits, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
13, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o15-o8-13/goldman-sachs-to-buy-ge
-bank-unit-with-16 -billion-of-deposits [http://perma.cc/X8CD-G3T3].
216. GE To Sell $3o Billion Commercial Lending and Leasing Businesses to Wells Fargo, GEN. ELEc.
(Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.genewsroom.com/press-releases/ge-sell-30-billion-commercial
-lending-and-leasing-businesses-wells-fargo-281985 [http://perma.cc/3SEK-HKIGM].
217. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of
Its Determination Regarding GE Capital Global Holdings, LLC, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 10
(June 29, 2016), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/GE
%2oCapital%2oPublic%2oRescission%2oBasis.pdf [http://perma.cc/7G72-7HT4]; Michael
J. de la Merced, G.E. Files To Spin Off Retail Finance Unit, N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (Mar.
13, 2014, 5:10 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2o14/o3/13/g-e-files-to-spin-off-retail
-finance-unit [http://perma.cc/8DFX-YPDG]; Alex Webb, GE Completes Synchrony Credit-
Card Unit Spinoff in Exchange Deal, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2015, 7:09 AM), http://www
1387
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
December 1,j 201,,-: GECC sell s its ComIImIIrlcial len Idinlg a IId leCasing tillsill ss in IIJapanYII."
March 2, 2016: GE sells its indian comnercial lending and leasing.
Mari I6 2016:' [T i Council notified GE ( agenitA thatthe Coinci\as m oiedtctingit third
ai-ua1 Ievahtionl of its finsil (Ictcination. regairding the company. The Council invitcd
the crnnpjany to nwct %\ th staffand to siei tcis for co1{ idc tiotibh\ thc Collin 117
March 29, 2016: SEC announces the sac of its U. SF. hotel frachise lotatu s. it.
March 31,2016: GE Capitl onad a s pttc sliimis iole the Council, r lting that th
Cbu l weesind it ad FSOC.de ubtio c s m f b ni r t
April2016: "n etar 0ff of Council me is and meC r agecies io-t ith the cocessnT."h
Mai to June p6e ed11 rcspo tesiollo foing stff f Council iwmerS 1nd me ril
20G5 E se to sbm d iniatieh G CCta cinfoiain to the Coancil inl a and ai
FSO duigit 66 eiw
June 28, 2016: FSOC announces the rescission of GECC's SIFI status.2
This timeline, while only a sampling, makes clear the working relationship
between GECC and FSOC. Public statements from both entities reveal that
meetings in early 2015 were crucial in GECC's decision-makng process. The
quantity and speed of divestments following GECC's announcement in April
2015 seem to indicate that GECC was confident that such changes would satisfy
FSOC during its 2016 review.
Given both the timeline of divestitures and GECC's close working relation-
ship with FSOC, GECC presents a quintessential example of the benefits that
.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2o15 -11-17/ge -completes -synchrony- credit- card- unit
-spinoff-in-exchange-deal [http ://perma.cc/65TR-XSRD].
218. Gareth Allan, GE To Sell Commercial Lending and Leasing Business in Japan, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
15, 2015, 2:08 AMv), http ://wwxw.bloomberg.com/news/articleS/2015-12-15/SUMitOMO-MitSUi
-to-buy-ge-s-japan-leasing-unit-for-4-8 billion [http://perma.cc/XU4T-VREQ].
219. GE To Sell India Commercial Lending and LeasingBusiness to Buying Consortium Backed byAION
Capital Partners, BUSINESSWIRE (Mar. 2, 2016, 12:35PM), http://www.businesswire.com
/news/home/2ol603o2oo6172/en/GE-Sell-India-Commercial-Lending-Leasing-Business
[http://perma.cc/7DCT-WZ78].
220. Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its Determination Regarding GE
Capital Global Holdings, LLC, supra note 217, at 3.
221. WesternAlliance Bancorporation To Acquire GE Capital's U.S. Hotel Franchise Finance Loan Port-
folio, BUSINESSWIRE (Mar. 29, 2016, 4:56 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home
/2ol60329oo6549/en/Western-Alliance-Bancorporation-Acquire-GE-Capital%E2%80%99s
-U.S [http://perma.cc/7LNX-RY441.
222. Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its Determination Regarding GE
Capital Global Holdings, LLC, supra note 217, at 3.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its Determination Regarding GE
Capital Global Holdings, LLC, supra note 217.
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Pigouvian regulations afford by leaving business decisions in the hands of the
regulated businesses. Ultimately, the Federal Reserve achieved the same result it
would have obtained through more traditional command-and-control regula-
tions -i.e., the divestiture of risky assets and the de-designation of GECC. But,
by vesting discretion in GECC instead of unilaterally deciding which assets to
shed, the Federal Reserve allowed GE to determine the timing and scope of di-
vestitures. In this way, GE could determine for itself which business lines to shed
and which to keep. This is, of course, not the case with a command-and-control
regulation where it is the lawmakers or regulators who decide whether a certain
activity is permissible.2 26
The regulated entity can decide which business opportunities to pursue, and
in effect, what level of regulation it is willing to tolerate. GECC is again a case in
point.2 In April 2015, when GECC announced its plans to shed its SIFI label, it
also announced plans to retain certain bank-like activities. In its press release
announcing the new strategy, GECC noted its intent to keep its "vertical financ-
ing" businesses including GE Capital Aviation Services, Energy Financial Ser-
vices and Healthcare Equipment Finance, since these "directly relate to [GECC's]
core industrial businesses."22 Consequently, one newspaper compared GECC
postdivestment as "essentially a captive finance arm," which exists to support the
core business lines of the firm.229 FSOC noted the positive features of this change
in its rescission notice: "GE Capital now focuses on the healthcare, energy, and
aviation leasing markets, among others, in which other large financial institu-
tions are generally less concentrated."23 0
Ultimately, by June 28, 2016, GECC and FSOC had both achieved their
goals. GECC had shed its SIFI designation while following its own business plan
and increasing shareholder value.23 1 FSOC had satisfied itself that material fi-
nancial stress at GECC would not pose a systemic threat to the U.S. financial
226. This is not always a bad thing. For example, most probably favor a ban on fraud in the sale or
purchase of securities, see 17 C.F.R. § 24 0.1ob-5 (2018), even if there is significant disagree-
ment over the meaning or reach of the SEC's antifraud provisions.
227. Recall that if the regulators were not satisfied with GECC's actions with respect to its de-
designation actions, the regulators could have denied its de-designation request.
228. GE To Create Simpler, supra note 193.
229. Ben McLannahan, General Electric Makes Divestiture ofFinancial UnitAdd Up, FIN. TIMES (July
24, 2016), http://www.ft.com/content/a6bo2fae-5o51-11e6-8172-e39ecd3b86fc [http://
perma.cc/QX4M-JJEF].
230. Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its Determination Regarding GE
Capital Global Holdings, LLC, supra note 217, at 18.
231. Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its Determination Regarding GE
Capital Global Holdings, LLC, supra note 217.
1389
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
markets, and in the process, reduced the number of firms that could be consid-
ered too big to fail.
b. AIG's Response
AIG provides another example of how compliance costs emanating from
Dodd-Frank shape the behavior of nonbank financial institutions. FSOC desig-
nated AIG as a SIFI on July 8, 2013.232 AIG's designation should not come as a
surprise, as the firm was at the center of the financial crisis.233 In the designation
decision, FSOC noted that even though "[AIG]'s strategy, funding profile, and
global footprint have changed greatly since the financial crisis," it remained large,
complex, and deeply interconnected with other financial institutions.23 4 Yet, by
September 29, 2017, FSOC had rescinded AIG's designation, noting that "based
on [FSOC]'s analysis of AIG and changes since July 2013," material financial dis-
tress at AIG would no longer cause a systemic threat to financial stability in the
United States.23 5
In some important ways, AIG's story diverges from that of GECC. AIG re-
mains a central, albeit smaller, player in the broader financial markets in a way
232. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding American Inter-
national Group, Inc., supra note 190.
233. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, FIN. CRIsIS INQUIRY COMMISSION 352 (2011), http://www
.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/IlA9K-MQ99]
("AIG was so interconnected with many large commercial banks, investment banks, and other
financial institutions through counterparty credit relationships on credit default swaps and
other activities such as securities lending that its potential failure created systemic risk. The
government concluded AIG was too big to fail and committed more than $180 billion to its
rescue. Without the bailout, AIG's default and collapse could have brought down its counter-
parties, causing cascading losses and collapses throughout the financial system.").
234. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding American Inter-
national Group, Inc., supra note 190, at 2.
235. Notice and Explanation of the Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its
Determination Regarding American International Group, Inc. (AIG), FIN. STABILITY
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that GECC does not.236 AIG has over 90 million clients in the commercial, insti-
tutional, and individual insurance markets,237 while GECC has almost com-
pletely exited the business of consumer loans.2 38 in other ways, however, AIG
has followed a path similar to GECC's. AIG's total assets have decreased about
52% since 2007, and 9% since the end of 2012, resembling the decrease in assets
seen at GECC.239 Furthermore, central to the rescission of AIG's SIFI designa-
tion was its divestiture of substantial business assets. In particular, FSOC attrib-
utes the decrease in the firm's risk to three transactions24 0 : the sale of Interna-
tional Lease Finance Corporation in December 2013,241 the sale of AIG Advisory
236. As of July 2013, AIG was the third largest insurer in the United States; before the financial
crisis, it was the largest. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination
Regarding American International Group, Inc., supra note 190, at 2.
237. Notice and Explanation of the Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its
Determination Regarding American International Group, Inc. (AIG), supra note 235, at lo.
238. Summary of GE Capital's SIFI Rescission Request, supra note 195, at 6.
239. Notice and Explanation of the Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its
Determination Regarding American International Group, Inc. (AIG), supra note 235, at 11. AIG's
centrality to the financial crisis somewhat complicates the analysis of the effect of SIFI desig-
nation on AIG's strategy, since a number of large changes at AIG are the result of the govern-
ment's crisis intervention, which occurred years before Dodd-Frank. However, the rescission
notice makes clear that changes since designation were central to the rescission determination:
Initiatives conducted by the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, and the Treasury Department, which began in September 2008, ultimately
stabilized AIG. After these government interventions, AIG began to substantially
reduce its size and complexity by selling off numerous subsidiaries and exiting non-
traditional businesses (such as AIGFP [AIG Financial Products]). The AIG Sub-
mission states that since the Council's final determination in 2013, AIG has contin-
ued to reduce its size and risk by selling non-core operations and businesses,
simplifying its operations, and focusing on its more traditional insurance busi-
nesses (i.e., its property and casualty and life and retirement businesses).
Id.
240. Note that these transactions only include those divestitures specifically noted in FSOC's re-
scission letter. There are a number of other divestitures which arguably were also executed
due to SIFI designation compliance costs. See, e.g.,AIGAgrees To SellJapan Life InsuranceBusi-
ness to FWD Group, BUSINESSWIRE (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.businesswire.com/news
/home/2o i611140o6617/en/AIG-Agrees-Sell-Japan-Life-Insurance-Business [http://perma
.cc/ 7ZCE-HGA 7].
241. Julie Johnsson & Zachary Tracer, AIG Completes $716 Billion IFC Sale to AerCap, INS. J.
(May 15, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2o14/o5/15/329296.htm
[http://perma.cc/8NHT-R7J7] ("The divestiture of ILFC completes a series of sales that AIG
began in 2008 to repay its government bailout and focus the company on property-casualty
coverage and U.S. life insurance. The rescue swelled to $182.3 billion, and AIG finished re-
paying the U.S. in 2012. The insurer struck deals to sell more than $70 billion of units and real
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Group in January 2016,242 and the sale of United Guaranty Corporation in Au-
gust 2016.243 These "key actions" allowed AIG to "significantly reduce[] its size
and certain risks,"244 which (along with simplifying its corporate structure and
reducing its interconnectedness with other financial institutions) precipitated
the rescission of AIG's SIFI designation.
Like GECC, AIG's designation and rescission highlights key benefits of a
Pigouvian regulatory scheme. For one, AIG clearly executed these divestitures
and other reorganization moves because of the costs associated with the SIFI
designation, as evidenced by its rescission letter, which specifically referenced
FSOC's designation as motivating the divestitures.2 45 Bank analysts estimate
that the SIFI rescission will save AIG between $100 and $150 million each year
in compliance costs.24 6 Admittedly, the company and analysts both state that
these savings are "modest."247 However, there are noticeable benefits outside of
direct spending on internal compliance programs: for instance, AIG will not be
subject to future Federal Reserve regulations, including more stringent capital
requirements for SIFIs.248
Further, the rescission has made future acquisitions more plausible because
of the reduced regulatory burden. This benefit speaks to the ways in which
estate. The divestitures included the company's Japanese and New York headquarters, AIA
Group Ltd. and American Life Insurance Co.").
242. Greg lacurci, AIG Advisor Group Sold to Lightyear Capital, PSP Investments, INv. NEWS (Jan.
26, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/2o160126/FREE/160129951/aig-advisor
-group-sold-to-lightyear-capital-psp-investments [http://perma.cc/KN77-VU771.
243. See Sonali Basak & Katherine Chinglinsky, Further Simplifying, AIG To Sell United Guaranty to
Arch for $3.4 Billion, INS. J. (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news
/national/2016/o8/16/423329.htm [http://perma.cc/8KDW-LAHY]; Leslie Scism & Joann
S. Lublin, AIG Reaches Deal To Sell Mortgage-Insurance Unit to Arch Capitalfor About $3.4 Bil-
lion, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/aig-nears-deal-to-sell
-mortgage-insurance-unit-to-arch-capital-for-about--4-billion-147128 0311 [http://perma
.cc/65UP-2QNE].
244. Notice and Explanation of the Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its
Determination Regarding American International Group, Inc. (AIG), supra note 235, at 13.
245. Id. at 8.
246. Gloria Gonzalez & Matthew Lerner, AIG Set for Growth After Losing "Too Big To Fail" Tag, Bus.
INS. (Oct. 2, 2017, 2:34 PM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/2o171oo2/NEWSo6
/912316248 [http://perma.cc/6EUC-Y8EW] ("'There was definitely a big compliance effort
required and there was a significant cost to that, said James Auden, managing director at Fitch
Ratings Inc., in Chicago.").
247. Id.; Alistair Gray, AIG Sheds $15om in Costs Along with Sifi Label, FIN. TIMEs (Oct. 1, 2017),
http://www.ft.com/content/3lb36b9a-a662-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c [http://perma.cc
/IGMM3-9XE41-
248. Gray, supra note 247.
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Pigouvian regulations leverage the internal expertise of the regulated entity. For
at least those divestitures noted above, they were business decisions made by
AIG, rather than requirements imposed by regulators.24 9 And even before the
official rescission, AIG has been able to make new acquisitions, such as its pur-
chase of Hamilton USA in May 2017, which AIG intends to use to pursue tech-
nological innovations in insurance underwriting.2 50 The transaction is relatively
small ($11o million), but more importantly, it complements AIG's core insurance
business. This decision reflects what FSOC described as AIG's strategy to refocus
on its core insurance business products.25 1
Together, GECC and AIG demonstrate how readily nonbank SIFIs can re-
spond to the compliance costs imposed by Dodd-Frank. Both firms shed signif-
icant assets, simplified their corporate structures, and refocused on core activi-
ties. In return for reducing their riskiness, they were rewarded with reduced
compliance costs and less regulatory oversight.
c. MetLifes Response
Nonbank SIFIs' varied responses to their designation suggests that Dodd-
Frank's Pigouvian features allow both market participants and regulators to
home in on risky practices, while affording institutions needed flexibility. Met-
Life offers an intriguing example of how nonbank SIFIs could tailor their re-
sponses even outside of an iterative process with FSOC. Unlike GECC, MetLife
did not (at least not as available in the public record) coordinate with FSOC to
move toward rescission, nor did it lay out (at least publicly) a comprehensive
divestiture strategy aimed at eventual rescission. Instead of petitioning FSOC to
rescind its designation, MetLife took FSOC to court, arguing that its SIFI des-
ignation was arbitrary and capricious.2 5 2 On March 30, 2016, Judge Collyer of
249. This might be compared to the immediate post-crisis tuation in which the Fed injected $185
billion to rescue AIG and had extensive authority over the firm.
25o. AIG Agrees To Acquire Hamilton USA, Partner with Two Sima, Grow Insurtech Attune, INS. J.
(May 15, 2017), http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2017/05/15/45100.htm
[http://perma.cc/P6XH-UL99].
251. Notice and Explanation of the Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its
Determination Regarding American International Group, Inc. (AIG), supra note 235, at 12.
252. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016).
1393
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the D.C. District Court ruled in MetLife's favor and rescinded its SIFI designa-
tion.253 Though the government initially appealed to the D.C. Circuit, it dropped
its appeal in January 2018.254
Even as MetLife challenged FSOC in court, however, it took some significant
steps to reduce its size in a fashion similar to GECC and AIG. Indeed, it appears
that MetLife had a two-track plan to address its SIFI designation. The company
filed its case against FSOC in January 13, 2015.255 On January 12, 2016, several
months before the D.C. District Court handed down its ruling, MetLife an-
nounced its plan to spin off a significant portion of its U.S. retail insurance unit
into an independent company that would be known as Brighthouse Financial.256
The spun off company would have about $240 billion in assets, accounting for
about 20% of MetLife's operating earnings.25 At the time of its designation,
MetLife had about $909 billion in total assets, meaning that the spin-off in-
volved a quarter of the company.25 8
Steven Kandarian, CEO and Chairman of MetLife, explicitly noted that com-
pliance costs associated with its SIFI designation- specifically, the higher capital
requirements -had led to the spin-off because these costs would put the com-
pany "at a significant competitive disadvantage."25 9 Although Kandarian men-
tioned that the company was challenging its SIFI designation in court and "d[id]
not believe any part of MetLife is systemic[ly important]," he still emphasized
253- Id.
254. Ryan Tracy, MetLife Cements Legal Victory in Shedding "Systematically Important" Label, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2018, 9:o9 PM), http://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/metlife-and-fsoc-file
-motion-to-dismiss-appeal-in-sifi-litigation-1516325850 [http://perma.cc/FG9T-VX8H].
255. Douwe Miedema, U.S. Insurer MetLife To Sue Regulators over High-Risk Tag, REUTERS (Jan.
13, 2015, 7:42 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-metlife-lawsuit/u-s-insurer-metlife
-to-sue-regulators-over-high-risk-tag-idUSKBNolM A72o150113 [http://perma.cc/7HC4
-76UM].
256. Brighthouse Financial is the name given to MetLife's domestic retail business after it was spun
off into a new company. See Important Information About MetLife's U.S. Retail Business Separa-
tion, METLIFE, http://www.metlife.com/brighthousefinancial [http://perma.cc/CTD9
-27G4]; Bloomberg News, MetLife Weighs SpinoffofDomestic Retail Business as CEO Seeks Less




258. Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding MetLife, Inc.,
supra note 192, at 31.
259. Press Release, Brighthouse Financial Inc., MetLife Announces Plan To Pursue Separation of
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that "this risk of increased capital requirements contributed to [the firm's] deci-
sion to pursue the separation of the business" and that the company "would ben-
efit from greater focus, more flexibility in products and operations, and a re-
duced capital and compliance burden."2 60 Kandarian finally observed that the
spin-off was in accord with MetLife's broader "strategy to focus on businesses
that have lower capital requirements and greater cash generation potential."26 1
MetLife completed the spinoff on August 7, 2017,262 even though it was no
longer designated as a SIFI and the government's appeal was still working its
way through the D.C. Circuit. There are two ways to view MetLife's decision to
divest its retail insurance unit even after prevailing at the district court. On one
view, MetLife could have been concerned that the D.C. Circuit would overturn
the district court's decision, leading to MetLife's continued designation as a SIFI.
In that case, it seems likely that MetLife would have followed a path similar to
GECC and AIG in working within the FSOC process toward rescission. Alterna-
tively, MetLife could have believed that it would have won on appeal, but that
the divestiture was nonetheless a sound business decision. In either case, the
benefits of Pigouvian regulation are evident, as even the threat of increased com-
pliance costs incentivized MetLife to become less risky.
d. Prudential's Response
As of September 2017, Prudential is the only remaining nonbank SIFI.263
However, Prudential is currently considering different strategies that could lead
to the rescission of its SIFI designation.26 4 News reports indicate that Prudential
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Press Release, MetLife Inc., MetLife Completes Spin-Off of Brighthouse Financial (Aug. 7,
2017), http://www.metlife.com/about-us/newsroom/2o17/august/metlifecompletesspin-off
-of-brighthouse-financial [http://perma.cc/W6DK-HJRM].
263. See Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Final Determination Regarding Prudential
Financial, Inc., supra note 191; see also Richard Teitelbaum, Prudential Has No Plans To Shed
Businesses: CEO, WALL ST. J.: CFO J. (Feb. 12, 2016, 11:10 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com
/cfo/2o 16/02/12/prudential-has-no-plans-to-shed-businesses-ceo [http://perma.cc/TNJ7
-FPX7 ] (noting that, so far, Prudential is the only one of the four nonbank SIFIs that has not
pursued a divestiture strategy).
264. Jesse Hamilton, Prudential is Plotting Its Escape from Fed's Tough Oversight, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
17, 2017, 11:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o17-o8-17/prudential-is
-said-to-plot-its-escape-from-fed-s-tough-oversight [ tp://perma.cc/ZLU9-L5RT].
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sees potential promise both in a legal challenge, like MetLife's, and in following
a path similar to AIG or GECC in working within the FSOC process.265
Unlike its peer nonbank SIFIs, Prudential has not yet pursued a large-scale
divestiture strategy, which would likely be necessary to have its SIFI designation
rescinded.2 6 6 However, even Prudential's divergent strategy highlights the ben-
efits of Pigouvian regulations. Here, the regulated entity had apparently decided
(at least before the change in administration opened even more opportunities for
financial institutions to lobby FSOC2 67) that the compliance costs associated
with being a SIFI were outweighed by the benefits of its current mix of busi-
nesses. In a different regulatory context (i.e., command and control), the SIFI
designation could have led to mandatory divestitures. Here, however, as exem-
plified by Prudential, the optimal structure for a large financial institution might
be to remain a regulated SIFI. Pigouvian regulations allow firms to do so.
Ultimately, the divergent paths of the four nonbank SIFIs highlight the ben-
efits of Pigouvian regulations. The SIFI designation process allows for coordi-
nation and cooperation among the r gulators and regulated entities. Further, the
process keeps business decisions in the hands of the entities with the most infor-
mation about the effective allocation of resources - the regulated business them-
selves. And most importantly, the Pigouvian compliance costs associated with
SIFI designations allow for varied results. In the cases of AIG and GECC, com-
pliance costs resulted in firms significantly reducing their size and potential for
systemic risk. In return, they received a reduced regulatory burden. In the case
265. Hamilton, supra note 264 ("Prudential is preparing to push a federal watchdog - the Financial
Stability Oversight Council -to remove it from a list of nonbanks that regulators concluded
would threaten the financial system if they collapsed . . .. Another factor helping Prudential
is rival MetLife Inc.'s legal victory last year overturning its label as a systemically important
financial institution, or SIFI.").
266. See Teitelbaum, supra note 263 ("More broadly, Mr. Strangfeld also said he was comfortable
with Prudential's current mix of businesses, signaling that the firm has no plans for major
asset sales. 'We're just focused on three things -retirement, protection and asset manage-
ment,' he said. 'What we have today is very conscious, very deliberate. It's by design. It's not
by default."'). Prudential has executed some asset divestitures, however, and could point to
those if it ever petitioned FSOC to rescind its designation. For example, in November 2016,
Prudential sold its Korean life insurance subsidiary to Mirae Asset Life Insurance for $148
million. Kirsten Hastings, Prudential Sells Korean Life Insurance Business to Mirae, INT'L AD-
VISER (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.international-adviser.com/news/1o32537/prudential
-sells-korean-life-insurance-business-mirae [http://perma.cc/4NAG-467K]; see also Jon
Menon, Prudential Agrees To Sell Unit in Japan to SBI for $85 Million, BLOOMBERG (July 16,
2013, 8:03 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2o13-o7-16/prudential-agrees
-to-sell-unit-in-japan-to-sbi-for-85-million [http://perma.cc/X6US-JMLM] (discussing
Prudential's July 2013 sale of its Japanese life insurance unit for $85 million).
267. Hamilton, supra note 264. ("Prudential quietly began its exit campaign as soon as Trump's
Treasury secretary, Steven Mnuchin, arrived on the job in February, sending him a welcome
letter contending that its status as a SIFI wasn't appropriate . . . .").
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of MetLife, compliance costs prompted both resistance and experimentation,
leading to delayed divestures and a refinement of FSOC's administrative process.
And in the case of Prudential, the firm decided that maintaining its size and in-
terconnectedness i a price that it is willing to pay. In exchange, FSOC can apply
enhanced regulatory standards to minimize the systemic risks that Prudential
poses to the economy. Finally, each of these cases also demonstrates the benefits
of allowing regulators to impose compliance costs that are tailor-made to a firm's
unique structure and risks - allowing firms to respond as they deem fit, in ac-
cordance with their own financial strategies and risk-tolerance.
3. Reducing Systemic Risk
To be sure, one might object that these divestitures are of little significance if
firms simply replaced the business units they spun off with other risky activities.
In other words, Dodd-Frank's compliance costs would have little effect at reduc-
ing systemic risk if banks simply replaced one risky investment with another.
The evidence, however, suggests that banks and other institutions regulated by
Dodd-Frank have, in fact, become safer over time. Of particular significance is
that many banks have downsized and simplified in ways not explicitly required
by Dodd-Frank, and that annual stress tests identify these divestitures as reasons
for reducing firms' compliance costs.
A number of academics and policymakers have argued that, although Dodd-
Frank has not ended too big to fail, it has reduced the systemic risks posed by
SIFIs. Larry Summers, Director of the National Economic Council under Presi-
dent Obama, for example, noted that " [p] olicymakers and political commenta-
tors alike have heralded Dodd-Frank as ushering in a new era of financial secu-
rity."268 During a Senate Banking Committee Hearing in 2014 regarding systemic
risk in the financial sector, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen likewise stated that
the Fed "ha[s] put in place numerous steps and ha[s] more in the works that
will strengthen these [financial] institutions, force them to hold a great deal of
additional capital and reduce odds of failure."269 International experts agree.
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, has observed that SIFIs have
increased their Tier 1 capital ratios, which are used to measure a SIFI's resilience
268. Sarin & Summers, supra note 96.
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to market turbulence and ability to absorb losses,2 7 0 more than twofold since
2009.271 These comments suggest that even though banks have grown since the
financial crisis, they have done so by concentrating in safer business lines -not
by investing in exotic and potentially destabilizing financial instruments.
Dodd-Frank regulators evince similar confidence in the stabilization of the
SIFI regime. As noted above, Dodd-Frank requires covered institutions to create
resolution plans detailing how the institution could be wound down without
taxpayer support.2 72 The Federal Reserve and the FDIC jointly determine each
year whether the plans are sufficient or have deficiencies that must be cor-
rected.2 73 Identifying the changes in a firm's resolution plan each year is thus a
good indicator of the firm's overall change in risk profile. Collectively, these liv-
ing wills suggest that SIFIs have grown less risky since the passage of Dodd-
Frank.
Morgan Stanley's 2016 resolution planning process provides a useful exam-
ple. On April 13th, 2016, the Fed and the FDIC announced that they had identi-
fied "weaknesses" in Morgan Stanley's 2015 plan, stating that it "was not credible
or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code"
and declaring that the firm would have to remedy these shortcomings in its re-
submission.24 After receiving this verdict, Morgan Stanley noted that resolution
270. E.g., Trefis Team, A Look at Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Ratios for the Largest U.S. Banks,
FORBES (March 6, 2015, 8:38 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2o15/o3
/o 6/a-look-at-common-equity-tier-1-capital-ratios-for-the-largest-u-s-banks
/#22370c4a3fa2 [http://perma.cc/S49J-PKEJ] (" [T]he common equity Tier I (CETi) capital
ratios are most often used as a quick reference to gauge a bank's capital strength and also to
compare them side-by-side."). For more information on what constitutes Tier 1 capital and
other categories of regulatory capital, see Capital, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://WWW.fdic
.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section2-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/L4UA-4G8G].
271. Sarin & Summers, supra note 96, at 2.
272. Dodd-Frank § 165(d); see also Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), FED. RESERVE, http://www
.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm [http://perma.cc/BFZ2-PA84]
(explaining that a "living will, must describe the company's strategy for rapid and orderly
resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure of the company").
273. Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), FED. RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov
/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm [http://perma.cc/BFZ2-PA84] (describing how plans
must be submitted "for supervision by the Federal Reserve").
274. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Resolution Plan Assessment Framework and
Firm Determinations, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 3 (2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg2ol6O4l3a2.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BJN-HFRT]. No-
tably, the regulators did not jointly find any part of Morgan Stanley's plan to be deficient. This
is significant because a deficiency finding indicates a violation of Dodd-Frank and potential
sanctions. See Ryan Tracy, Federal Reserve Corrects Letter to Morgan Stanley on Living Will,WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2016, 4:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-reserve-corrects-letter
-to-morgan-stanley-on-living-will-1460751758 [http://perma.cc/9X84-TZMW] ("The word
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planning was among "the highest priorities of [the] firm" and committed itself
to continue "work[ing] with [its] regulators to improve [its resolution plan]. "275
In their following April 14 th, 2016, letter, the two regulators provided more
detail to Morgan Stanley on where it had improved and where further progress
was needed in order for its resolution plan to be considered adequate.2 76 The
regulators found that Morgan Stanley had "improved its funding structure and
increased the level of firm-wide high-quality liquid assets, . . . developed a legal
entity rationalization framework," and "ha[d] reduced the overall number of le-
gal entities in its organizational structure," among a number of other changes
that made the firm simpler and safer.277 However, the regulators also noted
shortcomings related to liquidity, derivatives and trading activities, and govern-
ance mechanisms.278
Less than six months later, Morgan Stanley responded to each of the con-
cerns in the regulators' April 14 th letter and provided information on additional
actions Morgan Stanley intended to take in connection with its submission of its
2017 resolution plan.2 79 Finally, in December of 2017, the Federal Reserve and the
FDIC noted that Morgan Stanley's 2017 living will noticeably improved upon its
previous submission and, crucially, that the 2017 submission satisfactorily re-
sponded to the regulators' concerns.280
'deficiency' is significant in regulatory parlance because it means regulators believed the issue
violated the legal standard in the Dodd-Frank law. If regulators have concerns that don't rise
to that level, they have used a different word, 'shortcomings,' to describe them.") The regula-
tors also noted that Morgan Stanley had made some progress. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., supra, at 23 ("Notable progress was made with the firm's liquidity methodology
(post-resolution) and its governance mechanisms. However, the firm exhibited a particular
weakness related to its resolution-related liquidity position.").
275. Justin Baer, Morgan Stanley's Living Will Plan Rejected by Fed, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2016,
9:31 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/morgan-stanleys-living-will-plan-rejected-by-fed
-1460548808 [http://perma.cc/S8Q8-FT79].
276. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Sec'y of the Bd., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
& Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to James P. Gorman, Chairman &
Exec. Officer, Morgan Stanley 2 (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/pressreleases/files/morgan-stanley-letter-2o160413.pdf [http://perma.cc/U3LD-PFBP].
277. Id. at 4-5.
278. Id. at 5-1o.
279. Morgan Stanley 2o16 Resolution Planning Public Section, FDIC (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www
.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/morgan-165-161o.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ACU
-VZGX].
28o. Letter from Ann E. Misback, Sec'y of the Bd., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., &
Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to James P. Gorman, Chairman &
Exec. Officer, Morgan Stanley 4-5 (Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg2ol7l2l9a6.pdf [http://perma.cc/CF24-X7RF]. The
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The story is the same at other SIFIs. In 2016, for example, agency feedback
to Goldman Sachs noted similar improvements in its resolution plan compared
to previous years' submissions.28 1 The agencies noted that Goldman had "im-
proved [its] funding structure and increased [its] loss-absorbing capacity by in-
creasing [its] balance of high-quality liquid assets."28 2 Such an improvement
could not have been made if Goldman had acquired additional risky assets. In-
stead, it seems that Goldman has actually been pushing into plain vanilla retail
banking with an online banking platform, which is among the least risky finan-
cial activities.283 Indeed, Goldman's CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, explicitly stated that
the firm was expanding into this area because of new regulations. He confessed
that " [Goldman Sachs is] dissuaded from growing into certain activities that are
capital-intensive, and it's easier to grow into other areas that are more favored
regulators also noted other substantial steps taken by Morgan Stanley to improve its resolu-
tion capabilities. Id. ("MS has taken other significant steps. These include (i) improving its
capital and liquidity capabilities by developing approaches to estimate stand-alone financial
resource needs for each material entity; (ii) linking measures of estimated financial resource
needs to available resources to inform the timely filing of the parent company's bankruptcy;
(iii) developing a framework for the pre-positioning of capital and liquidity at material enti-
ties; (iv) entering into a contractually binding mechanism designed to provide capital and
liquidity support to material entities; (v) creating a framework to govern escalation of infor-
mation in support of timely decision-making; (vi) modifying its service contracts with key
vendors to include provisions intended to ensure the continuation of services; (vii) identify-
ing options for the sale of discrete businesses and assets under different market conditions
and taking actions to make those options actionable; (viii) prepositioning working capital in
service-providing entities; (ix) developing playbooks to support continued access to payment,
clearing, and settlement activities; (x) rationalizing its material service entity provider net-
work to employ certain hub entities to enable the provision of shared services; and (xi) en-
hancing its separability analysis to support sales strategies for its wealth management and
investment management businesses during resolution.").
281. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Resolution Plan Submission, GOLDMAN SACHS 4 (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/creditor-information/global-resolution
-plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/C7Z2-PT2R].
282. Id. at 5.
283. Nathaniel Popper, Meet Marcus, Goldman Sachs's Online Lender for the Masses, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/oS/19/business/dealbook/goldman-sachs
-to-offer-an-online-lender-for-the-masses.html [http://perma.cc/9SM6-UVJ6]. Goldman's
online banking platform offers online savings accounts and relatively small consumer loans,
business lines that it has not offered in the past. See Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper,
Goldman Sachs Plans To Offer Consumer Loans Online, Adopting Start-Ups' Tactics, N.Y. TIMES
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by the regulators and capital rules."284 It thus appears that in shedding its com-
modities, private equity, and hedge fund units, Goldman has been replacing
them not with similarly-risky businesses, but rather with safer ones that are fa-
vored by Dodd-Frank and the regulators who enforce the law.285
In sum, Dodd-Frank's living wills requirement demonstrates the success and
potency of Pigouvian regulations. As one commentator put it in describing the
results of the 2017 stress tests: "Not only are banks safer, but they finally under-
stand what regulators want."2 86
IV. THE BENEFITS OF PIGOUVIAN REGULATIONS
The previous Parts show that Dodd-Frank is functioning like a Pigouvian
regulation and that Pigouvian incentives are working to prompt both bank and
nonbank SIFIs to shed some of their riskiest assets. This Part builds upon that
observation to argue not only that Dodd-Frank has Pigouvian characteristics,
but also that its Pigouvian functions are in many ways superior to more tradi-
tional forms of regulation. Specifically, compared to traditional command-and-
control regulations, Pigouvian regulations are more flexible and are better able
to incorporate firm expertise into the regulatory scheme. Likewise, compared to
traditional market-based approaches, Pigouvian regulations may be a more pre-
cise and adaptable method of addressing negative externalities. They are also
likely to be more politically feasible, rendering them a preferred regulatory
model when more onerous command-and-control methods might be impossible
to pass.
284. Randall Smith, Goldman Sachs, Bank to the Elite, Makes Pitch to the Masses, N.Y. TIIEs (NOV.
16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2ol6/11/17/business/dealbook/goldman-sachs-bank-to
-the-elite-makes-pitch-to-the-masses.html [http://perma.cc/72CF-BGGC].
285. A similar trend is also exhibited with Bank of America. In its last stress test, the Federal Re-
serve approvingly noted that Bank of America had eliminated sixty percent of its legal entities,
including 400 units that had been active until just that year. Bank ofAmerica Corporation 2o16
Resolution Plan Submission, BANK OF AMERICA 2, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg
/resolution-plans/boa-lg-2ol6lool.pdf [http://perma.cc/MN9T-X9SL]. The Fed's willing-
ness to reduce Bank of America's capital requirements in response to such actions reflects the
Fed's view that Bank of America's moves contributed to a net reduction in risk.
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A. Regulatory Flexibility
A notable benefit of Dodd-Frank's Pigouvian regulations is that they are
more flexible than alternative regulatory approaches because they allow regula-
tors to tailor compliance costs to the risks generated by individual SIFIs. To be
clear: this benefit does not inhere in all market-based-regulations, but stems
from the fact that Dodd-Frank grants regulators authority to tailor costs to the
risks posed by specific firms in the manner described above. An ordinary Pigou-
vian tax would likely apply equally with equal force to different financial institu-
tions. Dodd-Frank's flexibility stems from the fact that capital requirements and
stress tests allow regulators to account for idiosyncrasies of individual firm busi-
ness models and adjust costs according to the risks posed by each particular firm.
There are two different reasons why it is desirable for regulators to be able
to adjust the costs Dodd-Frank imposes on individual SIFIs. First, regulators can
reward SIFIs for reducing risk and penalize them for failing to do so. Second,
regulators can respond if they determine that certain activities are riskier than
they thought, or if market conditions change. In this way, Dodd-Frank has
shown itself preferable to traditional command-and-control prohibitions insofar
as it allows for "right-sizing"2 8 7 - a process by which banks calibrate to their so-
cially optimal size, structure, and organization. This Section describes the bene-
fits of right-sizing, providing examples of where it has occurred within the
Dodd-Frank scheme while also pointing out its limitations.
At the most fundamental level, right-sizing is important because large firms
create benefits, both for themselves and the financial sector writ large. For ex-
ample, large firms can better exploit economies of scale, diversify risks, spread
overhead costs, offer combinations of complementary products, and expand
their global reach than smaller firms.288 As Bernanke has argued, "In the long
287. Bernanke uses this term to refer to the process we describe. Bernanke, supra note 19.
288. For a summary of the literature on scale benefits in the financial services industry, see Loretta
J. Mester, Scale Economies in Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform, FED. RES. BANK
MINNEAPOLIS (Sept. 1, 201o), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/scale
-economies-in-banking-and-financial-regulatory-reform [http://perma.cc/DLQ5-4GQE],
which explains that "a growing body of research supports the view that there are significant
scale economies in banking'" See also Joseph P. Hughes, Loretta J. Mester & Choon-Geol
Moon, Are Scale Economies in Banking Elusive or Illusive? Evidence Obtained by Incorporating
Capital Structure and Risk-Taking into Models of Bank Production, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 2169
(2001) (finding constant scale benefits in banking holding companies and tying those benefits
to risk diversification); David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, Do Large Banks Have Lower
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run, a U.S. financial industry without large firms would be less efficient, provid-
ing fewer services at higher cost."289 Furthermore, a strategy that simply resulted
in breaking up SIFIs could involve ceding primacy in the financial services in-
dustry to countries governed by other regulatory regimes.2 90 For these reasons,
the focus should not be on downsizing, but on right-sizing,2 91 as it best main-
tains firms that will be optimal in terms of their benefits and risks.
Of course, this proposition raises the question of whether it is possible for
regulators to know the socially optimal size of a specific bank ex ante. First, it is
worth noting that this problem would also exist if the government took a more
direct approach and broke up banks through regulatory fiat. Moreover, the
mechanism adopted by Dodd-Frank has the advantage of allowing regulators to
recalibrate costs over time. Thus, while it is unlikely that the bank regulators will
initially know if a bank has reached its optimal size, Dodd-Frank adopted a flex-
ible regime that empowers regulators to see how the market reacts to certain
developments and then adjust accordingly.
-EU38] (" [S]cale economies are a plausible (but not necessarily only) reason for the growth
in average bank size.").
289. Bernanke, supra note 19.
290. Id.
291. In his speech given as a governor of the Federal Reserve, Stein used a compelling example to
illustrate this point:
There are three banks: A, B, and C. Banks A and B both have $1 trillion in assets,
while C is smaller, with only $400 billion in assets. Bank A actually generates sig-
nificant economies of scale, so that it is socially optimal for it to remain at its current
size. Banks B and C, by contrast, have very modest economies of scale, not enough
to outweigh the costs that their size and complexity impose on society. From the
perspective of an omniscient social planner, it would be better if both B and C were
half their current size.
Now let's ask what happens if we impose a size cap of say $500 billion. This size
cap does the right thing with respect to Bank B, by shrinking it to a socially optimal
size. But it mishandles both Banks A and C, for different reasons. In the case of A,
the cap forces it to shrink when it shouldn't, because given the specifics of its busi-
ness model it actually creates a substantial amount of value by being big. And in the
case of C, the cap makes the opposite mistake. It would actually be beneficial to put
pressure on C to shrink at the margin -that is, to move it in the direction of being
a $200 billion bank instead of a $400 billion one - but since it lies below the cap, it
is completely untouched by the regulation.
Jeremy C. Stein, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Regulating Large Financial Institutions (Apr.
17, 2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein2ol3o4l7a.htm [http://
perma.cc/83PG-N6WH].
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As demonstrated by GECC292 and the discussion of commodities regulations
more broadly,2 93 a targeted increase in firms' capital requirement (or the threat
of one),294 can prompt SIFIs to divest themselves of billions of dollars in finan-
cially lucrative business lines. The power behind this incentive structure depends
on regulatory flexibility. If the Federal Reserve did not have the authority to ad-
just capital requirements quickly, then the carrot and stick method would be far
less effective.2 95
Moreover, the ability of Dodd-Frank to tailor costs to each individual firm
with respect to certain regulations has an important benefit over Pigouvian taxes
as well - it allows regulators to account for the fact that the risks associated with
different activities will vary by firm.2 9 6 Imagine that a particular kind of com-
modities trading would introduce significant financial risk if owned by Bank A
but have no negative effects if owned by Bank B. In this case, neither a Pigouvian
tax nor a command-and-control regulation would achieve the optimal outcome
of preventing only Bank A from trading the commodity because they would be
either over- or under-inclusive. On the one hand, the regulators might deter
both firms from owning the commodities unit by pricing the firms out of the
unit (with a Pigouvian tax), or prohibiting them from trading the commodity
(through a command-and-control regulation). On the other hand, regulators
might allow both firms to own the unit. With a Pigouvian regulation, by con-
trast, regulators can increase Bank A's regulatory burden for engaging in such
activities without affecting Bank B - deterring Bank A from the activity while
allowing Bank B to continue undisturbed. In this way, regulators can achieve the
optimal outcome for both firms.
Finally, unlike command-and-control regulations and Pigouvian taxes,
Dodd-Frank's Pigouvian regulations allow regulators to adjust costs over time,
so that banks can authorize activities previously deemed too dangerous if market
conditions change. This is what happens every time the relevant bank regulators
292. See supra Section III.C (documenting how the SIFI designation for nonbank firms leads to
heightened capital requirements).
293. See supra Section III.C.I.
294. To be clear, as discussed in Section III.C, generally the Fed has not increased capital require-
ments. It has instead found that certain assets, such as commodities, should be considered
riskier for purposes of calculating Tier i equity. The effect, however, is to increase the amount
of assets for purposes of calculating capital requirements, which increases the amount of cap-
ital that banks have to hold against those assets.
295. We define "quickly" as the ability to change capital requirements on a yearly basis.
296. See Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1673,1676-77
(2015) (asserting that Pigouvian taxes are likely to be more effective when marginal cost is
close to average cost).
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change a capital requirement or revoke the SIFI designation for a nonbank firm.
For example, while the costs of commodities trading may not currently outweigh
their returns for Bank A, it is possible that future circumstances might change,
in which case it might make sense for banks to reenter the commodities market.
Such recalibration is possible under a Pigouvian regime, but- given the political
process297 -it becomes much more difficult if there is a direct ban or established
tax. Thus, for the sake of both expertise and fine-tuning, Pigouvian regulations
are invaluable.
B. Informational Advantages
In addition to enabling right-sizing, Pigouvian regulations empower the
party most knowledgeable about the costs and benefits of an activity to deter-
mine the best way to comply with regulations. This approach is both more effi-
cient and more effective than command-and-control regulation. While a com-
mand-and-control regulator should hypothetically be able to determine the
socially optimal amount of an externality-producing action (and limit it accord-
ingly), in the real world of administrative costs and imperfect information, reg-
ulators cannot possibly know both the costs and benefits of each activity as well
as those closer to the activity itself.298 Therefore, it is possible that regulators will
impose absolute prohibitions on activities where the benefits of the activity ac-
tually outweigh the risk. Pigouvian regulations help mitigate this informational
asymmetry because a regulator need only know the spillover costs and benefits
associated with an activity- leaving firms themselves to undergo the private
cost-benefit analysis and determine market demand as the firms themselves will
ultimately decide whether they should bear costs imposed by regulation and
continue the activity.
This approach has two benefits related to expertise. First, this characteristic
of Pigouvian regulations incorporates firm knowledge and expertise into the reg-
ulatory scheme. When using compliance costs rather than bans, regulators have
an opportunity to see how much of a certain activity is desirable from firms' per-
spective, which incorporates the market demand for a good as measured by what
297. See infra Section IV.D.
298. See Masur & Posner, supra note 9, at 95 ("A perfectly conducted cost-benefit analysis should
produce results as efficient as a Pigouvian tax, but in a world of administrative costs, com-
mand-and-control regulation will be inferior."); cf Shannon M. Grammel & Joshua C. Macey,
The Costs of Aggregating Administrative Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 123, 123-24 (2018),
http://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/o1/70-Stan.-L.-Rev.
-Online-123.pdf [http://perma.cc/864A-TMXA] (arguing that administrators are well posi-
tioned to know the costs incurred by the agency in disbursing administrative entitlements).
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level of an activity firms think will be profitable. To the extent that market de-
mand reflects the social benefits of the good or service, Pigouvian regulations
place decisional power in the hands of the entity most equipped to assess the
costs and benefits of an activity. In this way, Pigouvian regulations allow for the
possibility that even risky activities can sometimes be desirable.
The second informational benefit of Dodd-Frank's Pigouvian approach is
that it allows regulators to adjust rules as they receive more information. Once
regulators observe how much the market values a particular activity, as measured
by firms' responses to compliance costs, regulators can adjust those costs accord-
ingly. For instance, imagine that Bank C and Bank D both participate in the same
commodities business, and the Federal Reserve increases the capital requirement
of both institutions by the same amount because it regards this business as risky.
If Bank C sells the business but BankD holds onto it, regulators will have learned
that Bank C, but not Bank D, regards the private benefit of holding this unit to
justify the increase in capital requirements. This could suggest that market de-
mand for Bank C's product is greater than that for Bank D's product, or else that
Bank D uses this unit in a more productive manner- such as to hedge or diver-
sify its other activities - than Bank C.299 Either way, the Federal Reserve might
regard this information as important when determining whether it should fur-
ther raise Bank C's capital requirement to prompt the firm to divest itself of this
unit altogether. If regulators felt that the social cost remained excessive, it could
further increase Bank C's compliance costs. If, on the other hand, the Federal
Reserve believed that the current capital requirement forced Bank C to bear the
true social costs of the activity, it might permit Bank C to continue trading be-
cause the market demand for that activity indicated that its social benefits out-
weighed its social costs.
In this way, as firms adapt to regulations, regulators not only affect firm be-
havior, but also acquire more information about the market value of certain ac-
tivities. Over time, this additional information allows the government to regu-
late with more precision.
C. Allocating Responsibility
The aforementioned benefits show that Dodd-Frank reduces risk ex ante at
the moment a firm or regulatory decision is made. But it is also worth noting
that the SIFI designation helps reduce risk ex post by forcing firms to pay for
299. Note that the latter option would suggest not that there is greater market demand for the
Bank C-produced commodity, but that the cost of the capital requirement fell less heavily on
Bank C because of the hedging or diversification benefits Bank C enjoys.
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their negative externalities when a risky decision goes poorly. This presents a
novel benefit. Although previous scholarship has discussed the benefits of a
Pigouvian approach as compared to the "command-and-control" model,0 0 the
literature on Pigouvian taxes does not account for the fact that Pigouvian regu-
lations can force the entity responsible for introducing systemic risk to itself re-
duce the riskiness and harmfulness of the activity. The most likely reason the
literature has failed to document this benefit is that most scholars assume a
Pigouvian approach must function like a tax.' The premise of a tax is that the
mechanism by which the government forces banks to internalize costs is by
transferring funds to the government.
Under Dodd-Frank, by contrast, regulators force banks to internalize the
costs of creating systemic risk not by taxing SIFIs, but by requiring them to, for
example, hold more capital, draft living wills, and perform stress tests. These
measures themselves reduce risk. In raising capital requirements, the Federal Re-
serve both increases the costs of being systemically important and makes the
party responsible for the externality better equipped to bear those costs since the
regulatory costs used in "right-sizing" the banks also require SIFIs to hold a cap-
ital buffer that will make them -rather than the government -the first line of
defense against an economic crisis. Thus, Dodd-Frank not only incentivizes
banks to divest risky assets, but also makes banks better able to withstand the
risk created by the assets they continue to hold.
D. Political Feasibility
Finally, Pigouvian regulations may simply be more feasible than regulatory
alternatives, either traditional command- and- control regulations or Pigouvian
taxes. It is no secret that the country has become more polarized and the legisla-
tive process has ossified.30 2 Changes in legislation must go through many "veto-
gates" - decisional moments in the legislative process, at which point a bill will
300. See Masur & Posner, supra note 9, at 95 ("Other forms of regulation are inferior to the Pigou-
vian tax.").
301. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
302. See Tyler Hughes & Deven Carlson, Divided Government and Delay in the Legislative Process:
Evidence From Important Bills, 1949-2010, 43 AM. PoL. REs. 771 (2015) (analyzing 2,20o Amer-
ican bills and finding that polarization suggests that the time to enactment of legislation is
significantly longer when government is polarized); Tyler Hughes & Deven Carlson, How
Party Polarization Makes the Legislative Process Even Slower when Government Is Divided, LON-
DON SCH. OF EcoN.: U.S. CENTRE (May 19, 2015), http://blogs.1se.ac.uk/usappblog
/2o15/o5/19/how-party-polarization-makes-the-legislative-process-even-slower-when
-government-is-divided [http://perma.cc/74BL-QXQC] (estimating the polarization delay
to be 6o days).
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either advance or die."as Each vetogate grants interest groups an additional op-
portunity to contest costly provisions, and Dodd-Frank targets one of the most
powerful interest groups in the country: large financial institutions.304 It would
have proven difficult -if not impossible -to dismantle banks that were too big
to fail through traditional command-and-control regulations. Furthermore, as
history has recently borne out, it is often easier to pass a regulation -even one
with a penalty-than an actual tax.os
As a result, in politically contentious arenas with powerful interest groups,
Pigouvian regulations may be a desirable way to regulate, as they look like ordi-
nary regulations but operate like taxes. In other words, they provide an alterna-
tive mechanism for regulators to achieve their desired result without the same
political roadblocks.30 6
V. PIGOUVIAN REGULATIONS
Despite these significant advantages, Pigouvian regulations have downsides.
Below we tackle what we believe to be the three largest potential sources of crit-
icism: the concern that banks will engage in regulatory arbitrage, the problem
posed by "Black Swan" events, and the fear that structural constraints will limit
the benefits of Pigouvian regulations. In our view, however, these costs are not
unique to Pigouvian regulations and are in many cases more pronounced in com-
mand-and-control regulatory approaches.
303. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441,
1442-43 (2008) (summarizing vetogates).
304. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends
To Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012).
305. This point was forcefully made in the political commentary surrounding the individual man-
date in the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Paul Starr, The Mandate Miscalculation, NEw REPUB-
LIC (Dec. 14, 2011), http://newrepublic.com/article/98554/individual-mandate-affordable
-care-act [http://perma.cc/LGS2-JICYN] (noting that "Senate Democrats chickened out from
framing the [individual mandate] penalty as a tax").
306. The legal and legitimacy challenges to SIFI regulations are beyond the scope of this Note. See,
e.g., MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016) (find-
ing that MetLife was not lawfully designated a SIFI).
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A. Regulatory Arbitrage
"Regulatory arbitrage" is the process by which firms exploit loopholes in a
regulatory scheme to avoid unfavorable regulation."0o Critics argue that as regu-
lators make it more difficult to engage in certain risky activities, banks will
simply shift their focus to other risky, but less-regulated activities - thus negat-
ing the benefit of the regulation.
There are a number of related arbitrage criticisms. For example, scholars in
the past have criticized capital requirements for causing banks to engage in reg-
ulatory arbitrage to avoid holding additional capital.o Likewise, more recently,
scholars have criticized Dodd-Frank for failing to adequately regulate "shadow
banking" -the financial activities involved in facilitating the creation of credit
across the global financial system, but that are not subject to regulatory over-
sight."o9 Others argue that onerous regulations will push risky activities away
from highly regulated banks and towards the less regulated entities.1 o
307. See, e.g., ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 236 -75 (2014); Erik F.
Gerding, The Dialectics ofBank Capital: Regulation and Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 WASH-
BURN L.J. 357, 362-63 (2016); David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord:
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35 (2000); Frank Partnoy,
Financial Derivatives and the Costs ofRegulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227-35 (1997).
308. See Guillaume Plantin, Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation, 28 REV. OF FIN. STUD.
146, 146-48 (2015) ("Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking
activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and
shadow banking institutions."); Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer
5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15730, 2010), http://pdfs
.semanticscholar.org/elee/d4l4bl4ebbdc9Slooef24cf4f2da6fa4522.pdf [http://perma.cc
/2JAP-4LTK] ("The main difference between on-balance sheet financing and financing via
conduits is that conduit assets are considered off-balance sheet for the purpose of capital reg-
ulation and therefore banks need to hold far less regulatory capital against assets in conduits
relative to assets on the balance sheet."); Eugene A. Ludwig, BankThink: Shadow Banking Will
Flourish as Dodd-Frank Squeezes Banks, AM. BANKER (July 19, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://www
.americanbanker.com/opinion/shadow-banking-will-flourish-as-dodd-frank-squeezes
-banks [http://perma.cc/ZG2E-ZDJN].
309. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 620-
22 (2012) (defining shadow banking).
310. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 275 (2010) (" [W] hen new forms
are chosen because they reduce regulatory costs and increase transaction costs compared to
the old structure, we lose twice: efficiency is reduced by the increase in transaction costs, and
the regulatory burden is shifted onto those who cannot engage in arbitrage."); Philipp Hal-
strick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:21 AM),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-regulation-shadow-banking/tighter-bank-rules-give
-fillip-to-shadow-banks-idUKLNE7BJooT2o111220 [http://perma.cc/4WKN-F7UB] ("In-
ternational regulators' efforts to strengthen the financial system by tightening bank rules may
inadvertently serve to boost opportunities for unregulated or 'shadow' financial players.").
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But these critiques ignore a critical fact: regulators have the ability to regulate
a wide swath of a SIFI's operations simply by finding that a certain activity will
make it difficult for the SIFI to unwind under OLA or lead to its living will hav-
ing shortcomings or being deficient. Thus, regulators who become aware of reg-
ulatory arbitrage - like shadow banking activities - can ratchet up compliance
costs to nudge the SIFI out of such activities, if they in fact post unacceptable
risks. Although there may be some concern that regulators will not be able to
spot SIFIs' engagement in under-the-table risks, this concern is not unique to a
Pigouvian regime.' If it later turns out that SIFIs have increased their exposure
to other risky markets, it simply falls to financial regulators to ensure that capital
requirements lead banks to fully internalize the costs of those new risks. In other
words, if banks migrate to other risky activities, financial regulators could ensure
that firms pay the social costs of engaging in those activities.
Moreover, there is little reason to be concerned that less-regulated entities
will simply take up risky activities where SIFIs left off. Insofar as SIFI regulations
push SIFIs away from risky activities, we should applaud their success in making
sure that systemically significant firms are avoiding inefficient risks. Similarly, if
nonbank firms take on an unacceptable level of risk, FSOC, within its statutory
strictures, can designate that firm a SIFI and thus subject it to the stringent re-
quirements faced by other systemically significant firms.312 For these reasons,
the critique that regulatory costs push risky activities from highly regulated
banks towards less regulated financial institutions is misplaced: the SIFI regula-
tions allow financial regulators to impose stringent requirements on bank and
nonbank firms alike, so long as the firm can be so-designated.
Ironically, the prospect of regulatory arbitrage may actually counsel in favor
of Pigouvian regulations as the best mechanism to prevent regulatory arbitrage.
It will never be possible for regulators to anticipate every source of systemic risk.
Prospective, substantive regulations will always be playing catch-up to financial
innovations. By contrast, the Pigouvian approach used in Dodd-Frank allows
regulators to adapt to new circumstances and information. In 2012, for example,
311. See, e.g., C. Eugene Stuerle, Defining Tax Shelters and Tax Arbitrage, URB. INST. (2002),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/defining-tax-shelters-and-tax-arbitrage/full
[http://perma.cc/49LZ-SJX5] (identifying regulatory arbitrage as a pervasive difficulty in tax
policy).
312. We recognize that the FSOC's designation authority can change. E.g., Tracy, supra note 254
(noting that the Department of Treasury recommends adopting a cost-benefit analysis to its
nonbank SIFI designation process).
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shortly after JPMorgan's London Whale trading desk incurred at least a $6.2 bil-
lion loss,"' the Federal Reserve expressed concern about JPMorgan and Gold-
man Sachs's forecasts for losses in a crisis.3 14 The London Whale trading losses
highlighted flaws in the calculations of risk-weighted assets,"' which are a cen-
tral feature in the calculation of capital requirements,3 16 and the Federal Reserve
became skeptical about the hedging strategies JPMorgan had used to manipulate
models, downplay risk, and thus reduce its capital burden.' Following the
scandal and the attendant regulatory scrutiny, JPMorgan released a report on its
internal investigation, noting numerous areas where it intended to change its
business practices in order to reduce risk."' It also coincided with JPMorgan's
313. See, e.g., Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case His-
tory of Derivatives Risks and Abuses, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
3-4 (http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-jpmorgan-chase-whale-trades-a-case
-history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses-march-15-2013 [http://perma.cc/9FJR-U52Y];
Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2016, 5:04 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-london-whale [http://perma.cc/3Q2M-GV5V].
314. Peter Eavis, Fed Rebukes Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase over Capital Plans, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2o13/o3/14/regulators-question
-goldman-and-jpmorgans-capital-plans [http://perma.cc/Q2ST-B84X].
315. See supra note 313.
316. Section 165 of Title I mandates enhanced supervision and prudential standards for bank hold-
ing companies (BHCs) and nonbank financial companies with assets greater than $5o billion.
Dodd-Frank § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012). It also requires that the Federal Reserve stablish
risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits in consultation with the FSOC. Id. The
Federal Reserve has promulgated rules for implementing these capital requirements. En-
hanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed.
Reg. 594 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252); Enhanced Prudential
Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,240
(Mar. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).
317. See JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses, supra note
313, at 3-4 ("JPMorgan Chase instructed the CIO to reduce its Risk Weighted Assets (RWA)
to enable the bank, as a whole, to reduce its regulatory capital requirements. In response, in
January 2012, rather than dispose of the high risk assets in the SCP - the most typical way to
reduce RWA- the CIO launched a trading strategy that called for purchasing additional long
credit derivatives to offset its short derivative positions and lower the CIO's RWA that way.
That trading strategy not only ended up increasing the portfolio's size, risk, and RWA, but
also, by taking the portfolio into a net long position, eliminated the hedging protections the
SCP was originally supposed to provide."); id. at 7 (" [R]isk evaluation models were targeted
by bank personnel seeking to produce artificially lower capital requirements."); id. at 14 ("Pre-
viously undisclosed evidence also showed that CIO personnel deliberately tried to lower the
CIO's risk results and, as a result, lower its capital requirements, not by reducing its risky
assets, but by manipulating the mathematical models used to calculate its VaR, CRM, and
RWA results.").
318. Report ofJPMorgan Chase & Co. Management Task Force Regarding 2o12 CIO Losses, JPMoRGAN
(Jan. 16, 2013) http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2272984969xox628656
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decision to begin spinning off commodities and private equity units to reduce its
Dodd-Frank-related compliance costs."'
Thus, whereas command-and-control regulations must pass through con-
gressional vetogates or comply with the onerous rulemaking process, Dodd-
Frank's compliance costs can be adjusted fairly quickly and with great effect. The
prospect of regulatory arbitrage suggests that regulators need tools to adjust to
new risk factors as they emerge, and the flexibility of Pigouvian regulations
makes them a superior solution to regulatory arbitrage, despite their inability to
stop the practice completely.
B. Black Swan Events
Another potential cost to Dodd-Frank is what one might call the "Black
Swan" problem.320 This problem posits that even ifPigouvian regulations reduce
the overall risk that a bank failure would trigger a global recession, they still fail
to address the scenario in which that risk actually comes to pass. In other words,
the regulations are of little added help in a worst-case scenario.
Like the concerns with regulatory arbitrage, this objection plagues all forms
of regulation. Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe that this concern is
not as grave as it may initially appear. First, Pigouvian regulations represent an
imperfect, but nonetheless uperior, approach to dealing with the too big to fail
problem than the ordinary command-and-control regulations enacted under
Dodd-Frank. Therefore, even if this approach cannot eliminate the Black Swan
problem, it fares better than traditional approaches in reducing individual SIFIs'
risk and in forcing a mass exodus from activities deemed unacceptably risky. Sec-
ond, Pigouvian regulations are merely one tool among many upon which regu-
lators can draw to manage negative externalities. Thus, while Pigouvian regula-
tions may not eliminate the risk of an economic crisis, they do help as part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. Third, regulators' ability to adjust compli-
ance costs quickly makes Pigouvian regulations better able to adapt to rapidly
/4cb574ao-obf5-4728-9582-625e4519b5ab/Task ForceReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/LSY8
-SPZP].
319. Peter Lattman, JPMorgan To Spin Out Its Private Equity Unit, N.Y. TIMEs (June 14, 2013),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2o13/o6/14/jpmorgan-to-spin-out-its-private-equity-unit
[http://perma.cc/R5JU-JDD5]; Press Release, J.P. Morgan, J.P. Morgan to Explore Strategic
Alternatives for its Physical Commodities Business (July 26, 2013), http://investor
.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=78o681 [http://perma.cc
/UGV 5-VVDD].
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changing market conditions in the event of an economic downturn. Conse-
quently, more than command-and-control regulations, Pigouvian regulations
allow regulators to adjust course as soon as they foresee a crisis - taking steps to
mitigate or even reverse financial losses before they occur.
C. Structural Limitations
Finally, although compliance costs have prompted SIFIs to spin off signifi-
cant business units, it is worth noting that the organizational structure of a given
firm may create a ceiling beyond which that firm can no longer divest additional
assets. Recall that a bank is automatically a SIFI if it has more than $50 billion
in assets. Although GECC was able to shed nearly all of its financial services op-
erations to escape the SIFI label, many other SIFIs would simply cease to exist if
they undertook a similar reduction. The deposits currently held by Citigroup,
Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and JPMorgan, for instance, approach $4 trillion,
which is roughly twenty percent of the GDP of the United States.321 No matter
how much regulators increase the cost of holding deposits, it would be difficult-
perhaps impossible -for these companies to tell customers that they could no
longer deposit checks in their generic commercial savings accounts. Customer
deposits are the bread and butter of traditional banking. Without them, banks
could hardly be considered depository institutions.3 22
Similarly, other firms do not share the idiosyncrasies of GE's business, which
played a critical role in allowing the company to shed its SIFI designation so
quickly and effectively. Unlike other firms, for instance, GE, the parent company
of GECC, had substantial non-financial business lines. It was therefore able to
continue essential business operations even after spinning off its financial activ-
ities.323 Imagine, however, if Goldman Sachs sought to shed all of its financial
321. Trefis Team, Q1 2015 U.S. Banking Review: Total Deposits, FORBES (May 22, 2015, 8:38 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2o15/05/22/ql-2015-u-s-banking-review
-total-deposits [http://perma.cc/Z8Z2-ZD96]; see Bureau of Econ. Analysis, National Income
and Product Accounts, Gross Domestic Product: Third Quarter 2017 (Advance Estimate), U.S.
DEP'T COM. (Oct. 27, 2017, 8:3o AM), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp
/gdpnewsrelease.htm [http://perma.cc/V593-PMCC] (showing U.S. GDP at $19.5 trillion).
322. Wells Fargo, for example, calls itself "America's Community Bank." Carrie Tolstedt, Senior
Executive Vice President, Community Banking, Wells Fargo, et al., Community Banking,
Presentation at 2014 Investor Day 1 (2014), http://wwwo8.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf
/about/investor-relations/presentations/2o14/community-banking-presentation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W3EH-MM7Q]-
323. See 2013 Annual Report, GEN. ELECTRIC CO. 41-47 (2013), http://www.ge.com/ar2o13/pdf/GE
AR13.pdf [http://perma.cc/32RM-ZH8E].
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activities: it would be left with an empty trading floor, some prime real estate,
and a (parody) twitter feed shorn of inspiration.324
That there may be a ceiling to Pigouvian regulations' potential, however,
does not mean that they represent an ineffective regulatory scheme. Rather, it
simply suggests that they ought to be used in conjunction with other measures
to reduce financial risk. Given Dodd-Frank's numerous other traditional com-
mand-and-control regulations, its Pigouvian features present an invaluable
mechanism for fine-tuning policy where its broader bans and fines fail to effi-
ciently reduce risk. For all the reasons discussed above, Pigouvian regulations are
valuable tools in the regulatory toolkit- one option among many, perhaps, but
a uniquely helpful option at that.
As both the regulatory arbitrage and Black Swan problems demonstrate, the
ability of regulators to respond to risky SIFI activities depends in large part on
their discretion to enact and modify Pigouvian regulations. Although Dodd-
Frank offers regulators more discretion than traditional command-and-control
regulatory schemes, further increasing regulatory discretion could amplify the
benefits already recounted above.
Recall the discussion of GECC, which detailed how it divested itself of bil-
lions of assets in order to shed its SIFI designation. Although the opportunity to
free itself of SIFI regulations proved a major incentive for GECC, Dodd-Frank
makes it virtually impossible for large banks to ever shed their SIFI designation,
given that any bank that holds $50 billion in assets is automatically a SIFI and
therefore subject to onerous requirements.3 25 The $5o billion mandate thus acts
as a hard floor that limits regulatory flexibility. But because greater regulatory
flexibility would reduce systemic risk, Congress should amend Dodd-Frank to
permit regulators to reduce the costs faced by SIFIs even if those SIFIs hold $50
billion in assets.
One scholar has already proposed a more flexible regime that would allow
regulators to reduce requirements for nonbanks that pose real, but insignificant,
risks to the financial system.32 6 There is no reason why this approach should be
limited to the nonbanks that generate risk. As we have shown, the SIFI designa-
tion allows regulators extraordinary latitude to tailor costs to the unique risks
posed by particular SIFIs. Banks that hold $5o billion in assets, however, auto-
324. See @GSElevator, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/gselevator [http://perma.cc/L68A-KUCQ].
325. 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012).
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matically face extremely high compliance costs. This fixed rule undercuts the in-
centives for SIFIs to downsize and impedes regulators in their quest o right-size
firms.327
CONCLUSION
There are certainly reasons to question whether Dodd-Frank is working:
foremost among them is that a SIFI failure could still trigger an economic crisis.
Yet Dodd-Frank is effectively reducing the risks that systemically important
firms will fail in the first place, though not necessarily for the reasons that aca-
demics and policymakers expected. The costs of complying with the Act - and
especially with SIFI designations - can be exorbitant. Regulators have the au-
thority to adjust those costs, and they have ramped up costs in response to con-
cerns that SIFIs have not done enough to reduce the risks created by their oper-
ations. As we have shown, the effect in many cases was to force SIFIs to divest
themselves of risky business units.
Each of these effects suggests that-despite persistent critiques-Dodd-
Frank is working in a manner few anticipated. Consequently, scholars and poli-
cymakers should think long and hard before moving to reduce or eliminate
Dodd-Frank's oversight entirely, and they should consider the effects of compli-
ance costs when debating how to reform Dodd-Frank. As a Pigouvian regulation,
Dodd-Frank provides a remarkable tool for regulators to right-size what are oth-
erwise systemically destabilizing institutions. This is a tool worth preserving.
Changing the narrative about Dodd-Frank, as this Note attempts, is an im-
portant first step.
327. Questions about the democratic legitimacy of such bureaucratic discretion are beyond the
scope of this Note. For a sampling of that broader discussion, see Christian Hunold & B. Guy
Peters, Bureaucratic Discretion and Deliberative Democracy 15-20, http://ecpr.eu/Filestore
/PaperProposal/Soddob9l-ff5 7-4b65-ae6b-a9ofo62cl26f.pdf [http://perma.cc/YQ5F
-Q5JQ], which documents numerous relevant sources.
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